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GOING BANANAS OVER EEC PREFERENCES?: A LOOK AT THE
BANANA TRADE WAR AND THE WTO's UNDERSTANDING ON
RULES AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE SETTLEMENT OF
DISPUTES
Zsolt K. Bessk6*
I. INTRODUCTION
IN DECEMBER 1994, the Contracting Parties of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), pursuant to a request by the Europe-
an Economic Community (EEC) under Article XXV of the GAIT,'
approved a five-year waiver on the trade provisions of the Fourth Lom6
Convention (Lom6 IV).' This waiver allows the EEC to provide preferen-
tial treatment for products originating in African, Caribbean, and Pacific
group countries (ACP)3 until February 29, 2000, free of the application
of Article I of the GATT which requires most-favored-nation treatment
among all GAIT contracting parties.4 In particular, this waiver affects a
* B.A., University of Pennsylvania 1991; J.D., University of Pittsburgh 1996. I
dedicate this Article to my grandmother, Cornelia Mecs, for her infinite wisdom and
support through the years. I would also like to acknowledge my appreciation to
Professor Ronald Brand for his guidance and many helpful comments.
' Article XXV(5) provides: "In exceptional circumstances not elsewhere provided
for in this Agreement, the Contracting Parties may waive an obligation imposed upon
a contracting party by this Agreement... ." General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.A.I.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, reprinted in 4 GATT,
BASIC INsmUMENTs AND SELECrED DocuMENTs 1, 44 (1969) [hereinafter GATT]. The
term EEC in this Article will also represent the European Union (EU) in order to
maintain consistency.
2 EU Includes Banana Framework Agreement in GATT Implementing Bill, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, Dec. 16, 1994, at 10 [hereinafter EU Includes Framework Agreement].
' These countries are ex-colonies of EEC member states. This group is mainly
made up of African nations; fifteen nations are from the Caribbean; eight are from the
Pacific. Douglas Matthews, Introduction to the Fourth ACP-EEC Convention of Lomg,
ASIL BASIC DOCUMENTs OF INT'L ECON. L., n. 3, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library,
BDIEL File. See Debra Percival, Development: ACP States May Lose Out When EU
Revamps Aid Policy, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Nov. 10, 1994, available in WESTLAW,
1994 WL 2750481 [hereinafter Percival, Development]; OLuFEmi A. BABARiNDE, THE
LoMt CoNvENTONS AND DEvELOPMENT 1-35 (1994).
' The Fourth ACP-EEC Convention of Lomi, GA7T Waiver Draft Decision, Dec.
7, 1994, GATT Council, restricted document, C/W/820/Rev.2 [hereinafter Waiver]; see
GATT, supra note 1, art. I, at 2.
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
most controversial aspect of Lom6 IV: the EEC's banana import regime.
Under Lom6 IV, the EEC has set up a banana import regime that gives
preference to bananas originating in ACP countries over bananas originat-
ing in third countries, primarily Latin American "dollar zone" countries.
Ever since the Latin American banana-producing countries lodged
their first complaint with the GAF in 1993 against the various EEC
Member States' pre-common market banana import regimes,6 the issue of
EEC's banana import regime has escalated into a "banana trade war."
After two unadopted GATI panel reports finding against two different
EEC banana import regimes, a European Court of Justice decision up-
holding the current EEC regime, and two U.S. Section 301 investigations
being initiated against (1) the current EEC regime and (2) an EEC side
agreement with a number of Latin American countries. The tensions
between the involved parties are running high with no imminent solution
in sight.7 By obtaining the waiver, though, the EEC precludes any further
attack upon its banana import regime on the basis of an Article I viola-
tion of GATT.8
Under the former GATT dispute settlement system, the EEC did not
have to fear being bound to a panel decision, because it could easily
block the adoption of a panel report." In contrast, under the new World
Trade Organization's (WTO) Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (Understanding), a panel report is
adopted automatically."0 In light of the strictness of the new Understand-
' Percival, Development, supra note 3; see PIEr EECKHouT, THE EUROPEAN INTER-
NAL MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 227-33 (1994). The Latin American "dollar
zone" countries include Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and Venezuela. Id., n. 210, at 229.
6 Columbia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Venezuela lodged a complaint
against the EEC Member States whose banana import regimes favored ACP country
bananas. Eventually, a panel was established and subsequently held in favor of the
Latin American countries. However, the panel decision was not adopted. EEC-Member
State's Import Regimes for Bananas, GATT Panel Report, Jun. 3, 1993, restricted docu-
ment, DS32IR [hereinafter GATT Panel #1]; Panel Rules Against EC Members' Restric-
tions on Bananas, GATT Focus, July 1993, at 2-3.
' See EU Will Not Alter 'Fundamental Nature' of Banana Import Policy, BNA
INT'L TRADE DAILY, Feb. 2, 1995, available in WESTLAW, BNA-1TD database; Debra
Percival, Trade: EU and ACP Seek GATT Waiver for Loma Accord, INTER PRESS SER-
VICE, Oct. 28, 1994, available in WESTLAW, 1994 WL 2723205.
See Waiver, supra note 4.
9 Under the old dispute settlement system, a panel report could have only been
adopted by consensus of all the GATT members. So essentially, any GATT member
had veto power to block any panel report. See GATT, supra note 1, art. XXV(3), at
44.
10 Articles 16(4) and 17(14) (in case of appellate review) of the Understanding
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ing, the waiver gives the EEC some breathing room. Although the waiver
does not preclude any contracting party from challenging the banana
import regime on either violations of other GATT provisions or non-
violations that otherwise nullify or impair a contracting party's benefits
under the GA'IT agreement or impede the attainment of any objective
under the agreement, the possibilities of either kind of challenge are very
slim." However, the United States has been feverishly trying to find
ways around the waiver as well as looking for methods available outside
the realm of the WTO to attack the regime." There have also been
suggestions that Guatemala may seek to request a panel under the
WTO. 3 Furthermore, when the waiver expires in February of the year
2000, the EEC banana import regime will probably not be able to
withstand a challenge under the WTO's Understanding.
The banana trade war has set up an ideal situation to analyze the
effects of a GATr waiver on the possible actions and remedies available
under the new WTO system. This Article considers actions and remedies
available under the new WTO dispute settlement system in a challenge
against the EEC's current banana import regime, despite the waiver of the
trade provisions under Lom6 IV from Article I obligations. The Article
first examines the history of the banana trade war by looking at the roots
of the EEC-ACP relationship, the structure of the different banana import
regimes, the previous GATT panel rulings, the European Court of Justice
case, the GAIT waiver, the EEC framework agreement with certain Latin
American countries, and the recent U.S. Section 301 actions against the
EEC and certain Latin American countries. The Article then discusses and
analyzes major dispute settlement changes which might affect the banana
trade war. One of the major changes is the procedural distinction between
an Article XXIII(l)(a) violation complaint and an Article XXI]I(l)(b) non-
violation complaint. Although the Understanding provides adequate
remedies for a violation case, the remedies afforded to a non-violation
provide that a panel report is adopted unless the GAIT members decided by consensus
not to adopt it. In essence, the Understanding turns the table on the old system by
taking away the veto power. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes, Annex 2 of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, arts. 16(4), 17(14), reprinted in PiERRE PESCATORE, HANDBOOK OF GATT
DIsPuTE SEYrEMENT D8/1, D8/15-17 (1994) [hereinafter Understanding].
" See Waiver, supra note 4; EU Includes Framework Agreement, supra note 2, at
10, 11.
" See EU's Brittan Affirms Willingness to Negotiate on Bananas, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Feb. 3, 1995, at 6.
" Nancy L. Perkins, Introductory Note, 34 I.L.M. 154, 161, n.22 (1995) (reviewing
the banana import regime situation).
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case under Article 26(1) of the Understanding are vague. 4 Under Article
26(1) of the Understanding, the question is open as to whether the
aggrieved Member may suspend its concessions against the aggrieving
Member.15 Finally, this Article explores the possible actions and reme-
dies available, if any, in a challenge to the EEC's banana import regime
in the face of a GATT waiver. This last part, inter alia, addresses the
applicability of and the limitations on a U.S. Section 301 action. In the
past, Section 301 was a very effective tool in expediting the panel
process as well as encouraging settlement.' 6 However, under the Under-
standing, both its effectiveness and compatibility with the dispute set-
tlement system are suspect.
1 7
I. HISTORY OF THE BANANA WAR
A. The Lomg Conventions
In order to have a complete understanding of the banana trade war,
we must briefly look at the foundation of the relationship between the
EEC and the ACP countries. Lom6 IV is the culmination of this relation-
ship. In a series of Lom' 8 Conventions which began in 1975, an alli-
ance was set up between an advanced market economy and less-devel-
oped countries with the purpose of promoting the development of the
ACP countries through special economic arrangements. 9
The roots of the Lom6 Conventions, however, reach far back to the
era of European imperialism. In fact, most of the ACP countries are ex-
colonies of Britain, Belgium, and France. The ex-colonies' organization as
sovereign states and access to the modern international order was a result
14 See Understanding, supra note 10, arts. 21-26.
,5 See id., art. 26(1). The provisions do not explicitly mention the suspension of
concessions. The use of the phrase suspension of concessions in the rest of the this
text also implies the suspension of other obligations under the covered agreements of
the Understanding. See id., art. 22. Member is referred to here and throughout the text
as being a member of the WTO and is synonymous with the term "contracting party."
See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. XI(1), reprinted in
PIERRE PESCATORE, HANDBOOK OF GATT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT WTO 1 (1994) [here-
inafter WTO Agreement].
16 See Ronald A. Brand, Competing Philosophies of GA7T Dispute Resolution in the
Oilseeds Case and the Draft Understanding on Dispute Settlement, J. WORLD TRADE,
Dec. 1993, at 117, 138; Daniel G. Partan, Retaliation in United States and European
Community Trade Law, 8 B.U. INT'L L. J. 333 (1990).
"' See James R. Arnold, The Oilseeds Dispute and the Validity of Unilateralism in
a Multilateral Context, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 187 (1994); Partan, supra note 16, at 345-
49; Brand, supra note 16, at 142.
Is Lom6 is the capital of the African nation Togo.
19 BABARINDE, supra note 3, at 1-5.
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of their colonial experience. It was this colonial relationship that laid the
foundations for the Lom6 Conventions.' However, it was a relationship
dominated by Europe, where the attitude of the imperialistic powers was
arrogant and contemptuous, often leading to paternalistic, patronizing,
dictatorial, and sometimes brutal behavior.2
The twentieth century brought an end to European imperialism with
the surge of anti-colonialism and a shift in power as a result of the world
wars. Consequently, after the Second World War, a new era of North-
South relations began. The imperial powers, aspiring for a better world
order, started to decolonize, and by the early 1960s had relinquished most
of their colonial possessions.' Furthermore, devastated and left in ruins
from the war, the European countries realized that they had much to gain
economically by including the colonies and ex-colonies within their scope
of rebuilding.' Therefore, in the Treaty of Rome of 1957, which estab-
lished the EEC between the six signatory states, eighteen African nations
were included within the EEC under associate status, keeping the special
relationship that had previously existed between the EEC members and
their ex-colonies.' As a result of their status, the African nations
benefitted from economic and technical assistance, including tariff prefer-
ences for their exports to the EEC market.' In exchange, the associates
provided the same preferential treatment to the imports from the EEC
members. Thus, these arrangements were reciprocal in nature. These
arrangements basically kept their same characteristics in the subsequent
Yaounde Conventions of 1963 and 1969.'
The Treaty of Accession in 1973, which brought Britain, Ireland, and
Denmark into the EEC, changed the face of the relationship between the
EEC and the ex-colonies.Y Britain pressed to have its former colonies,
2 MARJORIE LISTER, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD 1-
2 (1988).
21 BABARINDE, supra note 3, at 2.
"Id.
23 Id. at 2-3.
24 See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 4, arts. 131-36 and annex IV [hereinafter EEC Treaty]. The original six EEC
members included France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, and West
Germany.
EEC Treaty arts. 131-36 and annex IV; BABARINDE, supra note 3, at 3.
Convention of Association Between the European Economic Community and the
African and Malagasy States Associated with that Community, Jul. 20, 1963, 2 I.L.M.
971 (1963); Convention of Association Between the European Economic Community
and the African and Malagasy States Associated with that Community, July 29, 1969,
9 I.L.M. 484 (1970); Matthews, supra note 3.
' Treaty Concerning the Accession of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom
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otherwise known as the Commonwealth of Nations (which included
Caribbean and Pacific nations in addition to African nations), included in
the EEC under associate status as well. This pressure, along with an
appeal for a new international economic order in the late 1960s, prompted
the EEC to replace the Yaounde Conventions with a new arrangement
and change the relationship from association to partnership.' The ensu-
ing negotiations resulted in an agreement in 1975 between the EEC and
close to fifty African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries, called the
First Lom6 Convention (Lom6 I)Y' Major characteristics of this
agreement included: (1) a move toward non-reciprocal duty-free and
quota-free access to EEC markets for the ACP countries, (2) an export
earnings stabilization scheme, (3) financial and technical assistance
towards the development of the ACP countries, and (4) establishment of
implementing institutions for the convention." Lom6 I was seen as the
beginning of a new era in the economic relations between the two groups,
and an effort to deal with the chronic economic problems that plagued
the ACP countries. 1
Subsequently, Lom6 has been renegotiated three times. The second
Lom6 Convention was signed in 1980, the third in 1985, and the fourth
in 1989.3' Lom6 IV expires February 28, 200. 3 Aside from minor
changes and improvements, the major characteristics and the essential
nature of the subsequent conventions remains the same.34
B. EEC Banana Import Regimes
Banana production within the EEC has never been a big industry.
Therefore, the minimal production among the Member States, which is
unable to compete in the normal market because of structural disadvantag-
of Britain and Northern Ireland to the European Economic Community and to the
European Atomic Energy Community, Jan. 22, 1972, 1972 O3. SpEc. ED. 5 [hereinafter
Treaty of Accession]; BABARINDE, supra note 3, at 3.
28 Id. at 4.
" See ACP-EEC Convention of Lom6, Feb. 28, 1975, 1976 O.J. (L 25) 2, reprinted
in 14 I.L.M. 595 (1975) [hereinafter Lom6 I]. The ACP nations, led by Nigeria,
formed a united front during the negotiations. BABARINDE, supra note 3, at 4.
30 Lom6 I, supra note 29; BABARINDE, supra note 3, at 21-23.
3, Id. at 12.
32 Second ACP-EEC Convention of Lom6, Oct. 31, 1979, 1980 O.J. (L347) 2, re-
printed in 19 I.L.M. 327 (1980); Third ACP-EEC Convention of Lom6, Dec. 8, 1984,
24 LL.M. 571 (1985); Fourth ACP-EEC Convention of Lom6, Dec. 15, 1989, reprinted
in The Courier, No. 120, March-April 1990, 29 I.L.M. 783 (1990) [hereinafter Lom6
IV].
3 Id., art. 366(1).
34 BABARINDE, supra note 3, at 24-31.
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es, has been shielded from external competition such as the Latin Ameri-
can "dollar zone."'3 To make up for the remaining demand of bananas,
some Member States have imported their bananas from ex-colonies, where
similar structural disadvantages exist.' The Lom6 Conventions have
always protected these imports. 7 However, Member States such as Ger-
many, without either their own banana production or ex-colonies from
which to export, have imported the cheapest bananas they could find,
usually from the "dollar zone."38
1. Pre-Common Market
Prior to July 1, 1993, the EEC's only common policy concerning the
importation of bananas was a tariff rate of twenty percent ad valorem.39
In fact, this policy was not even that common. First, under Article 168(1)
of Lom6 IV, bananas imported from ACP countries entered the EEC duty
free.' Second, under the EEC Treaty, a protocol applying exclusively to
Germany provided for a quota of cheaper, "dollar zone" bananas to be
imported duty free." In reality, a number of national import regimes
existed.
Banana production within the EEC occurs in the countries of France,
Greece, Portugal, and Spain. 2 Quantitative restrictions on third country
imports protected these bananas from competition under Regulation
288/82 as well as the Act of Accession regarding Spain and Portugal.43
Britain, France, and Italy are the main importers of bananas originat-
ing from the ACP countries.' As mentioned above, banana imports from
the ACP countries were always afforded special treatment by the Lom6
Conventions. In addition to Article 168(1), Protocol 5 of Lom6 IV applies
exclusively to bananas and provides that "no ACP State shall be placed,
5 EECKHOUT, supra note 5, at 225.
36 Id.
' See Lom6 I, supra note 29; Lom6 II-IV, supra note 32.
38 EECKHOUT, supra note 5, at 225.
Council Regulation 2658/87, 1987 O.J. (L 256) 1, as last amended by Regulation
2913/92, 1992 O.J. (L 301) 1.
Lom6 IV, supra note 32, art. 168(1).
" EEC Treaty Protocol Concerning the Tariff Quota for Imports of Bananas.
42 EEC banana production is concentrated in four areas: Crete (Greece), Madeira
(Portugal), the Canary Islands (Spain), Martinique, and Guadeloupe (French overseas
departments). EECKHOUT, supra note 5, at 227.
3 Commission Regulation 288/82, 1982 O.J. (L 31) 1; Treaty of Accession, supra
note 27, protocol 2.
Britain is traditionally supplied by Caribbean countries such as Saint Lucia,
Dominica, Saint Vincent, and the Grenadines, Grenada, and Jamaica; France by
Cameroon and Cote d'Ivoire; and Italy by Somalia. EECKHOUT, supra note 5, at 228.
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as regards access to its traditional markets and its advantages on those
markets, in a less favorable situation than in the past or at present."'4 In
recognizing that the various national import regimes might cause problems
for the completion of the EEC internal market,' the Joint Declaration
Relating to Protocol 5 further provided that:
Article 1 of Protocol 5 does not prevent the Community from establish-
ing common rules for bananas, in full consultation with the ACP, as
long as no ACP State, traditional supplier to the Community, is placed
as regards access to, and advantages in, the Community, in a less
favorable situation than in the past or at present.'
Pursuant to the above provisions, Britain, France, and Italy have protected
ACP banana imports by applying quantitative restrictions against "dollar
zone" imports under Regulation 288/82 and Article 115 of the EC
Treaty.
4
Before the EEC common market was in place, this patchwork of
national banana import regimes existed. For France, Portugal, Spain, and
Britain, quota restrictions on banana imports existed. In addition, a twenty
percent ad valorem tariff applied to banana imports, except for bananas
originating from ACP countries, into these countries as well as into
Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.
Germany, on the other hand, essentially allowed all of its banana imports,
primarily from the "dollar zone," to enter duty free.
2. Post-Common Market
In the wake of the organization of the common market, the EEC
realized that its patchwork of national import regimes needed to be
consolidated into some type of uniform regime. Reaching an acceptable
accord among the Member States was a difficult task, in light of (1) the
EEC's pledge under Lom6 IV to protect the traditional ACP banana
imports regardless of the common market, (2) the EEC's commitment to
adhere to the GATT, (3) the need to protect the EEC's own production
of bananas, (4) the need to keep the interests of the "dollar zone" coun-
tries in mind, and (5) the goal of offering EEC citizens (particularly
4 Lom6 IV, supra note 32, protocol 5.
' EECKHOIUT, supra note 5, at 228.
47 Lom6 IV, supra note 32, annex LXXIV.
' Commission Regulation 288/82, supra note 43; EEC Treaty art. 115. ACP ba-
nanas are the only non-EEC products that have benefitted from Article 115 protection.
Normally, Article 115 is only imposed if national products are exposed to being
harmed by indirect imports. EECKHouT, supra note 5, at 229.
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Germans) reasonable prices 9
After over two years of extensive negotiations, the EEC Council
adopted a uniform banana regime in February 1993 to take effect on July
1 of that year. Regulation 404/93 set up a structured tariff quota sys-
tem. Four different categories of banana suppliers were identified: tradi-
tional ACP country imports, non-traditional ACP country imports, non-
ACP third country imports, and EEC bananas."1 Up to a maximum of
857,700 tons 2 of traditional ACP country imports are allowed to enter
the common market duty-free. Non-traditional ACP country53 and third
country imports are allowed to enter the common market up to a tariff
quota of two million tons. Within this quota, ACP country bananas enter
duty-free while third country bananas are subject to a 100 ECU per ton
tariff, which is essentially equivalent to the previous twenty percent ad
valorem tariff. Imports above this quota are subject to a 750 ECU per ton
tariff for ACP country bananas and an 850 ECU per ton tariff for third
country bananas.54
The allocation of import licenses for bananas within the tariff quota
is also established under the new regulation. These licenses for the non-
traditional ACP and third country bananas are distributed among three
categories:
(a) 66.5% of the licenses to operators who had marketed third country
and/or non-traditional ACP bananas;
(b) 30% to operators who had marketed Community and/or traditional
ACP bananas;
(c) 3.5% to operators established in the Community who started market-
ing bananas other than Community and/or traditional ACP bananas from
1992.5
The amount each importer under (a) and (b) can import is determined on
the basis of the average quantity each has sold in the three most recent
years for which figures are available.' The effect of this quota and
license system is that, in order to maintain or expand market share,
49 See id. at 230-31.
' Commission Regulation 404/93, 1993 OJ. (L 47) 1; see EECKHOtr, supra note
5, at 232-33.
5' Commission Regulation 404/93, supra note 50, art. 15.
52 See id., arts. 15, 18 & Annex.
3 Non-traditional ACP bananas include the quantities above the traditional amount
supplied by the ACP countries. Id., art. 15.
5 Id., art. 18.
55 Id., art. 19(2).56Id., art. 19(2).
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importers of "dollar zone" bananas have to import EEC and traditional
ACP country bananas.57
C. "Dollar Zone" Reaction - GA7T Panels
1. Pre-Common Market Regime
After failed consultations concerning the various national banana
import regimes between the EEC and a group of "dollar zone" banana
producers" in 1992, the "dollar zone" group requested the establishment
of a GATT panel. The "dollar zone" group complained that the various
import regimes, particularly the quota restrictions and the ACP preferenc-
es, were inconsistent with a number of GATT provisions, including
Articles I, XI, and XXIV." The GATT Council established a panel on
February 10, 1993, and the panel submitted its report to the contracting
parties on June 3, 1993.
All told, the panel found in favor of the "dollar zone" group, holding
that the various EEC Member States' banana import regimes were incon-
sistent with certain GATT provisions. First, the panel found that the quota
restrictions on bananas were inconsistent with Article XI(1)'s prohibition
of quantitative restrictions." The EEC argued that the restrictions were
excepted by Article XI(2)(c)(i), which allows quantitative restrictions on
agricultural products if they are necessary to the enforcement of govern-
mental measures aimed at restricting the quantities of the like domestic
product permitted to be marketed or produced.62 The panel, however,
found that the EEC did not meet the criteria of this clause.63 The EEC
further argued that the quota restrictions were valid in light of the
existing legislation clauses contained in the protocols through which the
certain EEC Member States had become contracting parties to the
GATT.' These protocols provide that Part II of the GATT, which in-
cludes Article XI, only applies to the extent not inconsistent with their
existing legislation on the day of the protocol.' The panel, on the con-
trary, found that the pre-existing laws were not mandatory in nature,
which is a necessary condition, and therefore were inconsistent with
57 EECKHOUT, supra note 5, at 234.
"' This group included Costa Rica, Colombia, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Venezuela.
59 GATT Panel #1, supra note 6.
' Id., para. 2.
61 Id., para. 326.
62 Id., para. 327.
63 Id., paras. 328-41.
' Id., para. 342.
' GATr, supra note 1, Protocol of Provisional Application, at 77.
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Article XI.' The panel recommended that the Contracting Parties request
the EEC to bring these quantitative restrictions into conformity with
Article X. 67
Second, the panel found EEC tariff preferences accorded to ACP
country bananas inconsistent with Article I's most-favored nation (MFN)
clause. It rejected the EEC's contention that the preferences could be
justified by the application of Article XXIV, which relates to customs
unions and free-trade areas, in conjunction with Part IV of the GAT. 68
There was no argument over whether the tariff preferences were inconsis-
tent with Article I's MFN clause. Clearly, the zero tariff for the ACP
bananas was not extended to the "dollar zone" bananas, for which a 100
ECU per ton tariff applied. As to the applicability of Article XXIV and
Part IV, the panel first found that Lom6 IV was not covered by Article
XXIV. Article XXIV is designed to allow the removal of all trade
restrictions among. members of a custom union or free trade area. Howev-
er, Lom6 IV's preferences are non-reciprocal, only removing restrictions
on imports from the ACP countries to the EEC.69 The panel further
found that the preferences were not justified taking Article XXIV in
conjunction with Part IV of the GATT. Part IV was intended to create
obligations for developed parties towards less-developed parties in addi-
tion to those found in the other parts of GATr. However, Part IV does
not allow contracting parties to accord preferences inconsistent with
Article I. Part IV was not intended to subtract from the other obligations
set forth in the rest of the GAIT." Therefore, the panel recommended
that the Contracting Parties request the EEC to bring the tariff preferences
into conformity with GATr provisions or seek a waiver for the preferenc-
es under Article XXV.7'
This panel report was only a temporary success for the "dollar zone"
group. First, the panel report was never adopted by the Contracting
Parties, since it was continually blocked by the EEC and ACP coun-
tries.' Second, the various national banana import regimes were termi-
nated less than one month after the panel report had been submitted to
the Contracting Parties with the implementation of the new uniform
6 GATT Panel #1, supra note 6, paras. 343-57.
67 Id., para. 374.
63 Id., para. 375.
9 Id., para. 368.
70 Id., para. 369.
71 Id., para. 375.
7 See EC Member States' Import Restrictions on Bananas, GAT" Focus, July
1993, 2,3; Council Defers Action on Banana Reports as EC Offers to Negotiate with
all Parties, GATT Focus, June 1994, 1, 5.
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banana import regime.' However, this panel report showed the weakness
of Lom6 IV's preferences as to international obligations and the EEC's
import regime philosophy.
74
2. Post-Common Market Regime
Even before the establishment of the first panel, above and before
the implementation of EEC's new banana import regime, the "dollar
zone" group was on track to obtain a second panel decision concerning
the validity of the new regime. On January 28, 1993, the "dollar zone"
group requested consultations with the EEC pursuant to Article XXII(1)
of GATT to discuss the EEC's new regime. However, since the new
regime had not yet been officially adopted, the EEC declined the request,
stating that the future regime could not be considered as a measure to
which the GATE would apply.7
The "dollar zone" group was successful the second time around. The
group made another request for consultations on February 19, shortly after
the EEC Council of Ministers officially adopted the new regime under
Regulation 404/93, and consultations were held between March 22 and
April 19, 1993.76 As a result of a failure to reach a mutually satisfactory
solution, the "dollar zone" group requested, pursuant to Article XXIII(2),
that a panel be established to investigate the new regime.' The request
was granted and the panel was established on June 16, 1993."8 The
panel report, which again found in favor of the "dollar zone" group was
not submitted to the Contracting Parties until March 23, 1994, nine
months later.79
The panel concluded, inter alia, that (1) the specific tariffs the EEC
applied in its new regime are inconsistent with Article II, schedule of
concessions; (2) the tariff preferences granted to ACP bananas imported
into the EEC are inconsistent with Article I's MFN clause; and (3) the
allocation of import licenses under the tariff quota is inconsistent with
'3 The panel report was submitted June 3, 1993 and the new regime was imple-
mented on July 1, 1993.
74 See EEcKHOUT, supra note 5, at 237.
71 See EEC-Import Regime for Bananas, Jan. 18, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 177, 181 para.
1 (1995) [hereinafter GATT Panel #2].
76 Id.
77 Id.
71 Id., para. 2.
79 Panel Report on EC Banana Import Regime Presented, GATT Focus, Jun. 1994,
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Article I and the national treatment requirements of Article If1.? As to
the inconsistency with Article II, the "dollar zone" group argued that the
specific tariffs applied by the EEC in its new regime accorded less
favorable treatment to banana imports than the EEC's twenty percent ad
valorem tariff contained in its schedule of concessions." Article II(1)(a)
provides that "each contracting party shall accord to the commerce of the
other contracting parties treatment no less favorable than that provided for
in the appropriate Part of the appropriate Schedule annexed to this
Agreement."' The panel gave two reasons why the new tariffs were
inconsistent with Article II. First, the tariff had changed from focusing on
the value of the bananas to focusing on the weight of the bananas.
Second, the "dollar zone" group had evidenced that the 100 ECU per ton
tariff, and more significantly the 850 ECU per ton tariff, had already
exceeded the twenty percent ad valorem equivalent after July 1, 1993.83
Therefore, the panel concluded that since the duty changed from an ad
valorem to a specific tariff and the new bound rate was either actually or
potentially higher than the twenty percent ad valorem, the new tariffs
accorded less favorable treatment to banana imports than that provided for
in the EEC's schedule of concessions.'
The "dollar zone" group also argued that the EEC's new import
regime is inconsistent with Article I's MFN clause.' Article I(1) states:
With respect to custom duties and charges of any ind... any advan-
tage, favor, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to
any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be ac-
corded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating
in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.'
Since the preference of duty-free importation of bananas granted to the
ACP countries was not accorded immediately and unconditionally to the
bananas imported from the "dollar zone" countries, the panel found that
the regime is inconsistent with Article I" The panel also rejected the
EEC's argument that Article XXIV justified its inconsistency with Article
I. As in the first panel report, the panel determined that Lom6 IV did not
fall under Article XXIV, and therefore the inconsistency with Article I
GATT Panel #2, supra note 75, para. 170, at 230.
sI Id., para. 132, at 216.
GAT, supra note 1, art. 11(1)(a), at 3.
'3 GATT Panel #2, supra note 75, para. 134, at 217.
'4 Id., paras. 134-35, at 217.
Id., para. 154, at 223.
GATT, supra note 1, art. I(1), at 2.
GATI1 Panel #2, supra note 75, para. 155, at 223.
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could not be justified.8 The panel further rejected the EEC's argument
that the tariff preferences under the Yaounde and Lom6 Conventions were
justified under Article XX(h) as being part of an intergovernmental
commodity agreement.89
The last issue addressed by the panel concerns the allocation of
import licenses under the EEC's tariff quota. The "dollar zone" group
contended that the regime, by reserving thirty percent of the licenses
under the tariff quota to operators who marketed EEC or traditional ACP
bananas in the past, distorts competition.' This distortion occurs, the
group argued, because such operators have a greater incentive to purchase
EEC or traditional ACP bananas. By purchasing more EEC or traditional
ACP bananas, these operators acquire a larger share of the tariff quota li-
censes, and, in turn, a larger portion of quota revenues. Therefore, the
group argued, the regime is inconsistent with Article IH(4) by favoring
EEC bananas over "dollar zone" bananas.9 Article 11(4) provides that
"the products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less
favorable than that accorded to like products of national origin." The
panel concluded that not only is the import licensing scheme more
favorable to EEC bananas than to "dollar zone" bananas, but it is also
more favorable to ACP bananas than to "dollar zone" bananas, and
therefore inconsistent with Article 111(4) as well as Article I(1), respec-
tively.9
3
The panel, however, did find that certain parts of the EEC's new
regime are not inconsistent with GATT provisions. First, the panel
determined that the tariff quota on non-traditional ACP and third country
bananas is not inconsistent with the Article XI prohibition on quantitative
restrictions, or the Article XIII prohibition on discrimination among sup-
plying countries.94 Second, the panel concluded that "the security require-
ments and other formalities connected with the importation of bananas
[are] not inconsistent with Article VIII.'  Finally, the panel found that
the EEC did not "act inconsistently with its obligation under Article
XVI(l) to discuss, upon request, the possibility of limiting the subsidiza-
I d., paras. 156-63, at 223-27.
'9 Id., para. 165, at 227.
0 Id., para. 143, at 220.
91 Id.
9 GATT, supra note 1, art. 111(4), at 6.
93 See GATT Panel #2, supra note 75, paras. 143-48, at 220-21.
94 Id., para. 169, at 230.
95 Id.
278 [Vol. 28:265
BANANA TRADE WAR
tion of bananas."
The panel concluded that the measures taken by the EEC under its
new banana import regime constituted a prima facie case of nullification
or impairment of benefits under Article XXIlI,' and in turn, recom-
mended that the Contracting Parties request the EEC to bring its banana
tariffs and the distribution of its tariff quota import licenses into confor-
mity with the provisions of GATT.9" Once again, however, adoption of
the panel report was blocked by the EEC and ACP states. Nevertheless,
this report put the EEC banana import regime into further jeopardy,
reemphasizing the inconsistency of Lom6 IV's preferences with the
GATT.
3. The Framework Agreement
During the second GATT panel report concerning the EEC's banana
import regime, the EEC and the "dollar zone" group continued negotia-
tions. Shortly following the submission of the panel report to the Con-
tracting Parties, the two parties, without the participation of Guatemala,
pieced together a framework agreement on bananas (Framework Agree-
ment) on March 29, 1994. 9 The Framework Agreement, in exchange for
waiving GATT action against the EEC, raised the tariff quota for non-tra-
ditional and third country banana imports to 2.2 million tons in 1995, and
lowered the tariff under the quota to seventy-five ECUs per ton."° The
Framework Agreement, which divides up the quota on a country-by-
country percentage basis, gives Colombia, Costa Rica, Venezuela, and
Nicaragua the right to issue export licenses as well as charge fees to
banana producers and marketers to enable exports to the EEC.'°' The
Framework Agreement, however, did not go into force right away. Each
country had to implement the agreement separately, and as of January 1,
1995, only Colombia, Costa Rica, and the EEC have done so.Y2 The
9 Id.
Id., para. 167, at 228.
I d., para. 170, at 230.
9 See Framework Agreement on Banana Imports, 34 LL.M. 1 (1995) [hereinafter
Framework Agreement].
'o Id., paras. 1, 7, 11.
I Id., paras. 2, 6. See Kantor, EU Wrestles with Proposal for Settling Banana
Dispute, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Dec. 9, 1994, at 1, 32; U.S. Launches Case on EU
Banana Policy, Threatens Latin Americans, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Oct. 21, 1994, at 12
[hereinafter U.S. Launches Case on EU].
"o U.S. Launches Section 301 Cases Against Latin Banana Producers, INsIDE U.S.
TRADE, Jan. 13, 1995, at 3; U.S. Official Threatens Speedy Retaliation Against EU
Banana Policy, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Dec. 23, 1994, at 7.
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agreement was opposed by other Latin American banana producers (in
particular Guatemala), the U.S., and Germany."n
D. German Objection-European Court of Justice Decision
In 1991, the EEC's supply of fresh bananas totaled close to 3.63
million tons, of which Germany's share was about 1.35 million tons or
thirty-eight percent. Of this German share, 1.345 million tons, or 99.7%
of fresh bananas, were imported from "dollar zone" countries." 4 These
figures, however, do not include unified Germany, which would raise
German consumption to almost half of that of the EEC."5 In 1992, the
World Bank published a report which, inter alia, calculated banana prices
in the different EEC Member States before the new banana import regime
went into effect. In Germany, the consumer price for bananas was about
$1.50 U.S. per kilogram, while in Britain and France it was $2.00 per
kilogram, and in Spain and Italy, it was around $2.50 per kilogram."°
Deducing from these figures, Germany has a big stake in the ramifica-
tions of the EEC's new banana import regime. With the new tariff quota
and the allocation system of import licenses, German importers are forced
to import more ACP and EEC bananas, therefore raising consumer pric-
es."° In order to protect its banana consumers as well as to maintain
the international integrity of the EEC, Germany challenged the banana
import regime in the European Court of Justice.
On May 23, 1993, Germany filed a complaint against the Council of
the European Union (Council), claiming that Regulation 404/93, the new
banana import regime, illegally discontinued its protocol under the EU
Treaty which allowed Germany to import an annual quota of bananas
duty-free. Furthermore, Germany argued that the new regime infringes
EEC law as well as the provisions of GATT."8 On June 29, 1993, the
"o EUIUS: US to Examine New EU Banana Import Regime, EUROPEAN REPORT,
Oct. 19, 1994, available in WESTLAW, 1994 WL 2727250 [hereinafter US to Examine
New Regime]; Chakravarthi Raghavan, Trade: EU's GATT Waiver Bid Seeks to
Safeguard ACP Exports, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Oct. 28, 1994, available in WESTLAW,
1994 WL 2723204.
,04 See GATT Panel #2, supra note 75, Annex, at 233.
5 See EU Upholds Banana Quota Despite German Challenge, WALL STREET J.
EUROPE, Oct. 6, 1994, available in WESTLAW, 1994 WL-WSJE 2039954 [hereinafter
EU Upholds Banana Quota].
"0 See David Dodwell, EC Banana Plan 'Grossly Inefficient' Says World Bank, FIN.
TIMES, Sept. 1992, at 36.
See EU Upholds Banana Quota, supra note 105.
108 See Case C-280/93, Federal Republic of Germany v. Council of the European
Union, 34 I.L.M. 165 (1995). The court does not mention what provisions of GATr
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European Court of Justice (Court) rejected Germany's request for an in-
terim measure to allow it to maintain its duty-free imports until the
Court's decision on the substantive issues of the case."° On July 13,
1993, Belgium and the Netherlands joined the case in support of Germa-
ny while Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Portugal, Britain, and the Commis-
sion of the European Communities joined the case in support of the
Council."
0
On October 5, 1994, the Court delivered its judgment, rejecting each
element of Germany's complaint and upholding the validity of Regulation
404/93."' The Court first held that the procedure for adopting the regu-
lation was carried out properly and, therefore, Germany's protocol was
effectively discontinued."' The Court then found that the new banana
import regime does not violate any of the substantive laws of the EEC.
The Court maintained that it was the objective of the EEC to create a
common organization of the market and to safeguard and ensure EEC and
ACP production, and that a difference in treatment is inherent in such an
integration."' The Court further rejected Germany's claim that the ba-
nana regulation breaches Article 168 of Lom6 IV by according different
treatment to ACP banana imports than before, i.e. applying tariffs to ACP
bananas exceeding the quota where previously ACP bananas were exempt
from all customs duties. The Court stated that the EEC's only obligation
is to maintain the advantages previously accorded to ACP countries, and
that the EEC has not breached this obligation under the new regula-
tion."' Last of all, the Court held that an individual within the EEC can
only invoke GATT provisions in a court to challenge EEC law and that
the Court can only take GATT provisions into consideration in limited
circumstances. These circumstances only arise if either (1) the EEC
intended to implement a specific obligation entered into within the GATT
framework, or (2) the EEC act expressly refers to particular GATT provi-
sions. Therefore, the Court concluded that this situation did not fall under
either of these exceptions and that Germany could not invoke GATT
provisions to challenge the EEC's banana regulation."5
the banana regulation infringes. The court points out that the point is moot because it
is precluded from taking GATT provisions into consideration to assess the validity of
this regulation. Id., paras. 103-12, at 175-76. See discussion infra.
10 Id., para. 24, at 169.
"1o Id., para. 25.
... See id., para. 119, at 176.
1,2 See id., paras. 27-43, at 169-70.
"3 See id., paras. 44-99, at 170-75.
"4 Id., paras. 100-02, at 175.
"' See id., paras. 103-112, at 175-76.
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Although Germany's bid to bring down the banana import regime
was unsuccessful, it has not given up. Germany has submitted another
complaint to the Court challenging the Framework Agreement under
Article 228 of the EU Treaty.116 Furthermore, along with Belgium,
Denmark, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, Germany has protested
against the banana import regime in the form of a written reservation to
the Uruguay Round accord. 7
E. U.S. Section 301 Investigation of the Banana Import Regime
Section 301 provides the medium in the United States through which
private parties can enforce U.S. rights under international trade agreements
and respond to certain unfair trade practices."' In essence, Section 301
is a domestic counterpart to the GATT dispute settlement system. An
investigation may be initiated by any person filing a petition to the U.S.
Trade Representative (USTR) or the USTR may initiate action on its
own."9 Under a Section 301(a) finding, akin to violation under Article
XXIfI(l)(a) of GATT, the USTR is obligated to take action against
policies or practices that either (1) violate, are inconsistent with, or deny
U.S. rights or benefits under any trade agreement or (2) are unjustifiable
and burden or restrict U.S. commerce, unless either a GAT panel finds
that U.S. rights were not violated or U.S. benefits were not nullified or
impaired under any trade agreement, or the USTR finds that the foreign
country is taking satisfactory measures to remedy the issue."' Under a
Section 301(b) finding, akin to a non-violation under Article XXIII(l)(b)
of GATT, the USTR has discretion in taking action against policies or
practices it believes to be unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or
restricts U.S. commerce.'' In either case, the USTR is authorized to
suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of trade concessions;
impose duties or import restrictions; or enter into agreements that remedy
the situation.'"
On September 2, 1994, Chiquita Brands International, Inc. (Chiquita)
and the Hawaii Banana Industry Association (Association) filed a petition
with the USTR alleging that certain policies and practices of the EU, Co-
116 See US to Examine New Regime, supra note 103.
" EU: Facing Row Over Banana Quotas, LLOYD'S LIST, Dec. 20, 1994, available
in WESTLAW, Int-News Database.
,, Trade Act of 1974, §§ 301-09, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988), commonly
referred to as Section 301.
"9 Trade Act of 1974, § 302, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 2412 (1988).
'2 Id. § 301(a), 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a).
121 Id. § 301(b), 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b).
" Id. § 301(c), 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c).
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lombia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Venezuela regarding the trade of
bananas are discriminatory, unreasonable, and burden or restrict U.S.
commerce." The petitions alleged that:
(1) Regulation 404/93 and related rules implementing an EEC banana
policy, including a restrictive and discriminatory licensing scheme
designed to transfer market share to firms traditionally trading bananas
from ACP countries and from EEC overseas territories and dependen-
cies; and
(2) the March 29, 1994 Framework Agreement between the EEC and
Colombia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Venezuela
are discriminatory and unreasonable as applied to U.S. banana marketing
companies importing bananas from Latin America.'24 Chiquita's main
complaint against the EEC is that the second category of import licenses
for "dollar zone" bananas, only available to those importers that tradition-
ally sell bananas from traditional ACP banana supplying countries, limits
its ability to obtain import licenses for "dollar zone" bananas because the
company does not sell ACP bananas."
Pursuant to Section 301's procedures, the USTR initiated an investi-
gation of the EU banana import regime and requested consultations with
the EU on October 17, 1994."2 The USTR refrained from initiating an
investigation of the Framework Agreement at that time because the
measures under the Agreement had not yet been implemented. However,
the USTR did warn that implementation of the Agreement would warrant
an investigation, and requested the involved parties to withdraw from the
agreement and instead, to seek a solution that conforms to obligations
under the GATr."
F. The Lom IV Waiver Under GATT
Under the collective pressure of two unfavorable GATT panel
reports, protest from within the EEC, the U.S. Section 301 investigation,
and threats from "dollar zone" countries to bring an action under the new
1 59 Fed. Reg. 53495 (1994).
124 Id.
125 USTR Asks EU Not to Interfere as U.S. Presses Latins on Bananas, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Apr. 7, 1995, at 1, 25 [hereinafter USTR Asks EU]. A recent report shows that
Chiquita lost around $711 million in 1994 as a result of the EEC's banana import re-
gime. USA: City-Banana Effect, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Apr. 18, 1995, at 23.
126 59 Fed. Reg. 53495 (1994).
127 Id.
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WTO, the EEC and the ACP countries which are Contracting Parties
sought to obtain a waiver for the trade provisions under Lom6 IV in
November 1994.1" Article XXV(5) of the GATT provides that "in ex-
ceptional circumstances not elsewhere provided for in this agreement, the
Contracting Parties may waive an obligation imposed upon a contracting
party by this Agreement."'29 Under the GAT 1947, the granting of a
waiver only required a two-thirds majority vote, while the WTO, which
took effect January 1, 1995, requires a three-fourths majority vote."
Therefore, it was clearly in the EEC's and ACP countries' interest to try
and obtain the waiver before January 1, 1995.
At the December 1994 GATT Council meeting, the Contracting
Parties approved a five-year waiver of the trade provisions under Lom6
IV from Article I's MFN clause. The waiver reads, in part:
Subject to the terms and conditions set out hereunder, the provisions of
paragraph 1 of Article I of the General Agreement shall be waived, until
29 February 2000, to the extent necessary to permit the European
Communities to provide preferential treatment for products originating in
ACP states as required by the relevant provisions of the Fourth Lom6
Convention, without being required to extend the same preferential
treatment to like products of any other contracting party.'
The waiver, in essence, permits the EEC to continue granting preferential
tariff treatment to ACP bananas. However, a Member can require the
EEC to enter into consultations "with respect to any difficulty or matter
that may arise as a result of the implementation of the preferential
treatment" covered by the waiver.' If the Member "considers that any
benefit accruing to it under the General Agreement may be or is being
impaired unduly as a result of such implementation," the consultations
must look to the possibility of making a satisfactory adjustment of the
matter.' The waiver further allows any Member to establish a panel if
such party believes that the relevant Lom6 IV provisions under the waiver
are being applied inconsistently with the waiver, or that any benefits
accruing to such Member under the GATT are being impaired unduly as
a result of the implementation of the preferential treatment to ACP
' See Wide Support for GAIT Waiver on Lomi IV, GATI' Focus, Nov. 1994, at
6.
,2 GATT, supra note 1, art. XXV(5), at 44.
'3 Id.; WTO Agreement, supra note 15, art. IX(3).
131 Waiver, supra note 4, para. 1.
132 Id., pa .3.
133 Id.
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products and the consultations have proved unsatisfactory.' Last of all,
the waiver does not preclude affected Contracting Parties to have recourse
to Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATr.' 35
Although the waiver only prevents a challenge to the EEC's banana
import regime on the basis of an Article I violation, the regime appears
to be safe from almost any other attack. However, a possible violation
claim is the allocation of the import licenses under Article III (national
treatment) discussed in the second GATT panel. Since the banana policy
was included in the Uruguay Round agreement and is contained in EEC's
schedule of concessions, an Article II violation claim, which was success-
fully challenged under the second GATT panel, would not be possi-
ble." The possibility of these claims and other actions will be further
discussed later in this Article.
G. U.S. Section 301 Investigation of the Framework Agreement
In the investigation of the EEC's banana import regime on October
17, 1994, the USTR declined to investigate the Framework Agreement
because it had not yet been implemented by the involved "dollar zone"
countries. The USTR did, however, warn that an implementation of the
agreement would clearly warrant such an investigation. 7 On December
1, 1994, Colombia implemented the Framework Agreement to take effect
on January 1, 1995.2 On December 27, 1994, Costa Rica also imple-
mented the Framework Agreement. 39 On January 9, 1995, the USTR
initiated an investigation to determine whether Colombia's and Costa
Rica's policies and practices under the Framework Agreement are unrea-
sonable, discriminatory, and burden or restrict U.S. commerce."4 Pursu-
ant to Section 301 procedure, the USTR requested consultations with
Colombia and Costa Rica concerning the matter under investigation. 4'
On March 8, 1995, the Framework Agreement came into force.42
134 Id., para. 4.
13 Id., para. 6.
' See U.S. Launches Case on EU, supra note 101, at 12.
,3 59 Fed. Reg. 53495 (1994).
'3 60 Fed. Reg. 3283 (1995).
131 Id. at 3284.
"41 Id. at 3283-84.
141 Id.
'" Belgium: EU, Latin Banana Trade Deal to Start Next Week, REUTERS NEWSWImE,
Mar. 1, 1995, available in WESTLAW, Int-News Database.
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H. The Status of Recent Negotiations
As of June 15, 1995, no significant progress had been made in
solving the banana trade war. The United States had tried, to no avail, to
pressure Colombia and Costa Rica into dropping the Framework Agree-
ment. The two countries insisted that the United States must take the
issue to the WTO rather than take unilateral action, which would have
been in violation of the WTO. 43 However, the United States hinted that
it might act outside the WTO by targeting sectors that are not covered by
the WTO, such as maritime services and investment.'" The EEC, as
well, did not give in to the pressures from the United States, Guatemala,
or even from within its own body, Germany and Belgium.
Nevertheless, the EEC reluctantly looked at two U.S. proposals to
change the banana regime. In the first proposal, the major changes the
United States pushed for included: (1) increasing the third country quota
volume from 2.553 million metric tons in 199545 to 2.75 in 1996, with
an annual growth rate thereafter, (2) establishing a license-free monthly
subquota system replacing the current complex system; and (3) eliminat-
ing the Framework Agreement.'" The proposal did not seek to change
any of the preferences accorded to ACP banana imports. 47 This first
proposal apparently did not go over well with the EEC because on March
20th, the United States came out with a more lenient proposal.'" The
United States was willing to accept the country-specific quotas under the
Framework Agreement as long as the figures were changed in a way that
was more favorable to Chiquita. Also, the United States proposed a
revamping of the import license allocation system in favor of companies
importing "dollar zone" bananas. 49 The United States, however, still
insisted that the quota be raised to 2.75 million metric tons in 1996 and
that the Framework Agreement be immediately withdrawn. EEC officials,
however, have hinted that even this proposal is too far-reaching.'50
43 U.S. Proposes Changes in EU Banana Rules in Latest Round of Talks, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, Mar. 10, 1995, at 2.
Id.
'4 The quota was raised in 1995 to accommodate for the addition of Austria,
Finland, and Sweden to the European Union. Commission Regulation 479/95, 1995 OJ.
(L 49) 1.
'" Confidential U.S. Proposal Seeks Major Changes in EU Banana Policy, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, Mar. 17, 1995, at 6-7.
147 Id.
"4 See USTR Asks EU, supra note 125, at 24.
149 Id., at 24-25.
150 Id.
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Im. MAJOR CHANGES UNDER THE WTo DISPUTE SETrLEMENT SYSTEM
A. Introduction to the WTO
As a result of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations,
a new "world order" was created by the establishment of the World
Trade Organization (WTO).' On January 1, 1995, the WTO replaced
the old GATT system providing a common institutional framework for the
conduct of trade relations between its members (Members) concerning the
agreements negotiated under the Uruguay Round.' Agreements on
goods, services, intellectual property, investments, and in particular, an
understanding on the rules and procedures governing dispute settlement,
are all under the auspices of the WTO.
The WTO provides a more formalistic organization than the previous
GATT system. The functions of the WTO include implementing, adminis-
trating, and operating the covered agreements as well as providing the
forum for trade negotiations among its Members concerning the matters
under the covered agreements. M The structure of the WTO is made up
of a Ministerial Conference and a General Council, each composed of
representatives of all the Members, which meet at least once every two
years and as appropriate, respectively. The General Council basically takes
over the functions of the Ministerial Conference in between its meetings
by carrying out the functions of the WTO, making decisions on all mat-
ters under any of the multilateral trade agreements, and taking any
necessary actions to such effect.'55 The General Council is also in
charge of discharging the responsibilities of the Dispute Settlement Body
provided for in the Understanding.'56 Finally, councils and committees
are created for various elements under the WTO, such as trade in goods,
services, and intellectual property, and development, fmance, and the
budget.'
151 See WTO Agreement, supra note 15.
152 Id., art. ][(1).
" Id., at List of Annexes.
15 Id., art. ][I.
1- Id., art. IV(I)-(2).
156 Id., art. IV(3).
157 Id., art. IV(5), (7).
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B. The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes
1. Introduction
The establishment of the WTO brought about, inter alia, a new
system of settling disputes covered by the Understanding. Under the
Understanding, the dispute settlement system received its own governing
body, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). The DSB is authorized to
administer the rules and procedures under the Understanding, including
establishing panels, adopting panel reports, maintaining surveillance of
implementation of the rulings and recommendations, and authorizing
suspension of concessions. 58 In terms of coverage, the Understanding
applies to the Agreement Establishing the WTO, the Multilateral Trade
Agreements, and the Plurilateral Trade Agreements.'59
The Understanding introduces some fundamental changes concerning
the rules and procedures of dispute settlement under the GATT. The key
changes under the Understanding include: stricter time limits, automatic
establishment of panels, automatic adoption of panel reports, appellate
review, limits on unilateral action, automatic authorization for suspension
of concessions, and separate treatment of non-violation complaints.
2. Stricter Time Limits
A crucial change from the previous dispute settlement system is the
imposition of time limits throughout the whole dispute settlement process.
The time limits set out under the Understanding improve upon and give
legal force to those set up under the previous Improvements to the GATT
Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures Decision of 12 April 1989,
which was only applied on a trial basis." As demonstrated in the Oil-
seeds case, the lack of strict time limits within the dispute settlement
system allowed the EEC to delay the process, and arguably the only
reason why the process moved along was the effectiveness of U.S.
Section 301 threats to retaliate. 6' The addition of strict time limits will
,' Understanding, supra note 10, art. 2.
159 See id., art. I & Appendix 1. The applicability of the Understanding to the
Plurality Trade Agreements is subject to the decision of the parties to a particular
agreement to set out the terms for the application of the Understanding. Id., Appendix
1.
60 See Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures
Decision of 12 April 1989, GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS,
61 (36th Supp. 1990).
161 Brand, supra note 16, at 127. Lack of strict time limits was only part of the
288 [V/ol. 28:265
BANANA TRADE WAR
most likely speed up the process and take the pressure off the use of
unilateral action.
Some of the main time-frames set up in the Understanding concern
consultations and the panel process. Regarding consultations, the time-
frame was set up in the following manner. After receiving a request for
consultations, a Member must reply within ten days and must enter into
consultations in good faith within at least thirty days. If the Member does
not respond to the request within the ten-day period or does not enter
into consultations within the thirty-day period, the requesting Member
may proceed directly to request the establishment of a panel. 62 If con-
sultations are entered into, the Members have sixty days from the date the
request for consultations was received to come to a settlement; otherwise,
the requesting Member may request the establishment of a panel. Howev-
er, the requesting Member can request the establishment of a panel within
the sixty day period if the consulting Members jointly agree that consulta-
tions have failed to settle the dispute. 63
The normal time frame within which a panel is composed and the
panel report is submitted to the parties in dispute must not exceed a
period of six months. In case of urgency, though, the panel must try to
issue its report within three months.' If the panel believes it cannot
meet the given time frame, it must notify the DSB, in writing, of the
reasons for the delay and an estimate of when the report will be issued.
However, in all situations, the time period from the establishment of a
panel to the submission of the panel report to the Members may not
exceed nine months.'" Once the panel report is circulated to the Mem-
bers for consideration, the report cannot be considered for adoption for at
least twenty days.'" The report will be adopted at a DSB meeting with-
in sixty days after the date of circulation of the report unless either a
party to the diipute officially notifies the DSB of its decision to appeal,
or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report.'67 In the case
of an appellate review, the Appellate Body must submit its report within
sixty days of the date the party to the dispute formally notifies the DSB
of its decision to appeal. The Appellate Body may delay the submission
of its report by notifying the DSB of its reasons for delay and estimated
ability to delay the process. The possibility to block the adoption of a panel report was
also a main factor in delaying a final settlement to the dispute. Id.
1' Understanding, supra note 10, art. 4(3).
'63 Id., art. 4(7).
'" Id., art. 12(8).
,65 Id., art. 12(9).
'66 Id., art. 16(1).
167 Id., art. 16(4).
28919961
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
time of submission, but in no case may the proceedings exceed ninety
days.' 6
In general, the period from the establishment of a panel to the time
the DSB considers the panel or appellate report for adoption must not
exceed nine months if the panel report is not appealed, or twelve months
if the report is appealed, unless the panel or Appellate Body decides to
extend the deadline for issuance as outlined above.
169
3. Establishment of Panels
Another significant change with the dispute settlement process was
that the establishment of a panel is now by and large, automatic under
the Understanding. Previously, to establish a panel, the Contracting Parties
had to agree by consensus, which meant that establishment could have
been blocked by any Contracting Party.'70 Now, at the request of the
complaining party, a panel is established no later than the next DSB
meeting unless the DSB decides by consensus not to establish a pan-
el."'" Therefore, in order to block the establishment of a panel, every
Member must be against such establishment. At the worst, if every other
Member decides against the establishment of a panel, the complaining
party has the deciding vote whether or not to establish a panel. Since it
was the complaining party who requested the establishment of a panel in
the first place, it will most likely decide in favor of establishing a panel.
Essentially, this translates into an automatic establishment of a panel.
4. Adoption of a Panel Report
Similar to the establishment of a panel, the adoption of a panel
report under the Understanding is essentially automatic. Previously, a
panel report had to be adopted by consensus, therefore allowing any
contracting party to block the adoption of the report. The Understand-
ing provides that the panel report is considered adopted unless either (1)
a party to the dispute appeals the finding of the report or (2) the DSB
decides by consensus not to adopt the report." If the panel report is
,68 Id., art. 17(5).
169 Id., art. 20.
171 See Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement, and
Surveillance, Nov. 28, 1979, GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTs,
210, 212 para. 10 (26th Supp. 1980).
17, Understanding, supra note 10, art. 6(1).
"7 See Ministerial Declaration, 38th Session at Ministerial Level, Nov. 29, 1982,
L/5424, GATI, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOcuMENTS, 9 (29th Supp. 1983).
,"' Understanding, supra note 10, art. 16(4).
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appealed, it is submitted for review by the Appellate Body.174 If the
panel report is not appealed, the situation is analogous to that of the
establishment of a panel: the report is, in essence, adopted automatically,
and the parties to the dispute are bound to the findings of the report.
5. Appellate Review Report Adoption
A completely new addition to the dispute settlement system, appellate
review allows a dissatisfied party to the dispute to have the panel report
reviewed by a separate body, the Appellate Body. 5 Once the Appellate
Body issues its report, the report is adopted by the DSB and uncondition-
ally accepted by the parties to the dispute unless the DSB decides by
consensus not to adopt the report. 6 Once again, as explained above,
since a consensus not to adopt the report is very unlikely, the adoption of
the report is rendered automatically, and the parties to the dispute are
bound to the reports' findings.
6. Limits on Unilateral Action
A considerable change to the dispute settlement system under the
Understanding was the express limitation put on unilateral action in
Article 23 of the Understanding. This limitation, not found at all in the
prior dispute settlement system, and in conjunction with stricter time
limits, attempts to strengthen the multilateral system by requiring the
Members to invest more reliance in the dispute settlement process."l
Article 23 provides that when a Member seeks the redress of a
violation or a non-violation' claim under any of the agreements cov-
ered by the Understanding, it has recourse to, and must abide by, the
rules and procedures of the Understanding.'79 Under these situations, a
Member is limited to the actions it may take. A Member cannot, on its
own, make a determination that a violation or a non-violation has oc-
curred except through recourse to the dispute settlement process under the
Understanding. If a Member does make its own determination, it must be
consistent with the findings of the adopted panel or Appellate Body
114 Id., art. 17(l).
'75 See id., art. 17.
176 Id., art. 17(14).
'7 See id., art. 23.
m A non-violation complaint is defined here as a nullification or impairment of
benefits other than a violation of obligations under the agreements covered by the
Understanding or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered
agreements. See GATT, supra note 1, art. XXIII(1)(b), at 39.
"' Understanding, supra note 10, art. 23(1).
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report."W As regards retaliation, a Member must follow the Understand-
ing procedures on surveying the implementation of recommendations and
rulings set forth in Article 21 as well as the procedures on determining
the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations set forth in
Article 22. Furthermore, before a Member suspends concessions or other
obligations under the covered agreements in response to the opposing
Member's failure to implement the recommendations and rulings, the
Member must obtain DSB authorization in accordance with Article 22
procedure.1
8
'
The Understanding appears to severely limit unilateral actions by
Members. In particular, the United States' use of Section 301 action
seems greatly reduced. This limitation, however, may not be as severe as
one might think. First, Article 23 does not mention and, therefore, does
not seem to limit taking initial procedural steps under unilateral action.
For example, in the U.S. a private party or the USTR can initiate an
investigation on a certain measure and request for consultations under
Section 301. In turn, the U.S. would request a WTO panel if it decided
the issue was worth pursuing." Second, the Article 23 limitation only
applies to situations covered by the WTO. For example, if the U.S.
wanted to redress an unfair trade practice that is not covered under any
of the agreements under the WTO, it could unilaterally retaliate. Likewise,
if the egregious party is not a WTO member, unilateral action can be
taken. Nonetheless, the use of remedial unilateral action in response to, in
particular, GATT violations or non-violations seems to be clearly prohibit-
ed by Article 23. Recourse to the Understanding in this type of situation
appears to be mandatory.'
7. Authorization of Suspension of Concessions
In the previous dispute settlement system, the authorization of and
resort to suspension of concessions was authorized in only one case."'
However, under the new rules and procedures, the use of suspension of
concessions may proliferate. In the prior system, authority to suspend
concession had to come from the Contracting Parties, which meant that
Io Id., art. 23(2)(a).
18, Id., art. 23(2)(b)-(c).
Trade Act of 1974, §§ 302-03, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2412-13 (1988).
" See ROBERT E. HuDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, 237 (1993)
[hereinafter HUDEC, ENFORCING]; See also Brand, supra note 16, at 137.
" In 1953, the Netherlands was authorized to suspend concessions against the
United States. See Netherlands Measures of Suspension of Obligations to the United
States, GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 32 (1st Supp. 1953).
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there had to be agreement by consensus." Under the Understanding,
Article 22(6) provides that if a member fails to implement the recommen-
dations of the panel or Appellate Body and to agree to compensation, a
request to the DSB by the aggrieved party to authorize suspension of
concessions will be granted by the DSB unless the DSB decides by
consensus to reject the request." Like the establishment of a panel and
the adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report, the authority to sus-
pend concessions is essentially granted automatically. However, the level
of the suspension of concessions must not surpass the level of the
nullification or impairment.Y
The aggrieving party can either object to the level of the suspension
proposed or claim that the principles and procedures in determining what
concessions are to be suspended were not followed properly under Article
22(3). If this is the case, then the matter is referred to arbitration. 8 If
the arbitrator concludes that the level of the suspensions is too high or
that the aggrieved party did not properly follow the principles and
procedures under Article 22(3), then the aggrieved party must conform to
such a decision. In any case, the arbitrator's decision is final and the
parties may not seek a second arbitration." 9 Again, this change further
takes away the need to resort to unilateral action by allowing Members
to rely on the WTO's dispute settlement system.
8. Non-Violation Complaints
A substantial alteration to the previous dispute settlement system was
the separation and distinction of the remedies afforded to a violation and
a non-violation complaint."l The stricter, more legal-minded dispute set-
tlement rules and procedures under the Understanding are geared more
toward a violation complaint. Under Article 26 of the Understanding, an
exception is carved out for a non-violation complaint, steering this type
of case more toward using negotiations to come to a mutual settlement
rather than forcing the offending party to abide by the rules of the
195 HUDEC, ENFORCING, supra note 184, at 194. See also GATr, supra note 1, art.
xx(2), at 40.
" Understanding, supra note 10, art. 22(6).
'"7 Id., art. 22(4).
"7 Id., art. 22(6).
Id., art. 22(7).
"90 See id., art. 26. Complaints of the type described in Article XXIII(1)(c) of the
GAT'r, i.e. the catch-all, is not analyzed here because (1) the remedy accorded to this
type of complaint is the same remedy that was accorded to it under the previous
system and, (2) this type of complaint has never been used before. See id., arL 26(2).
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covered Agreement. 9' This scheme, of course, makes sense under the
view that in a non-violation case, no express provisions are actually trans-
gressed. However, the fact is that under a non-violation case, benefits are
being nullified or impaired. Therefore, this irony leads to a major issue
of whether an aggrieved party may have any actual remedies available in
a non-violation case.
Generally, the rules and procedures under the Understanding apply to
a non-violation complaint, but they are subject to certain provisions. First,
the complaining party must proffer a detailed justification in support of
any complaint which relates to a measure taken by the aggrieving party
that does not conflict with the relevant covered agreement." In contrast,
for a violation complaint, the complaining party only has to provide a
brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint which sufficiently
presents the issue in a clear manner.'93 In effect, this difference affects
the establishment of the merits in a non-violation case by shifting the
burden of proof to the complaining party, therefore making it all the
more difficult to achieve a remedy.
Second, where a measure is found to be a non-violation impairment
or nullification of benefits or impediment of attaining any objective under
the relevant covered agreement, the aggrieving party has no obligation to
withdraw the measure. In such cases, the panel or Appellate Body only
recommends that the aggrieving party make a mutually satisfactory adjust-
ment. 94 In contrast, where a measure is found to be a violation of the
relevant covered agreement, the panel or Appellate Body recommends that
the aggrieving party bring the violating measure into conformity with such
agreement. 95 Then, if the aggrieved party does not implement the rec-
ommendation to conform within the stipulated period of time determined
under Article 21(3), the complaining party may seek compensation or be
authorized to suspend concessions."9 Therefore, the issue in a non-viola-
tion case becomes whether the aggrieved party may take such action, i.e.
resort to compensation or suspension of concessions, if the aggrieving
party does not implement the recommendation to make a mutually
satisfactory adjustment."9
Third, where the parties have entered into binding arbitration under
Article 21(3) to determine the reasonable period of time within which
191 See id., art. 26(1).
,91 Id., art. 26(1)(a).
,91 Id., art. 6(2).
194 Id., art. 26(1)(b).
195 Id., art. 19(1).
'9 Id., ar. 22(2).
"9 See Brand, supra note 16, at 140.
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implementation must occur, upon the request of either party, the arbitra-
tion may include a determination of the amount of benefits that have
been nullified or impaired as well as suggestions of ways and means to
reach a mutually satisfactory adjustment. However, these suggestions will
not be binding upon the parties to the dispute.1 9 Nevertheless, it ap-
pears as though the determination of the amount of benefits nullified or
impaired would be binding upon the parties to the dispute.
Last of all, as a final settlement to the dispute, compensation may be
part of a mutually satisfactory adjustment. 99 In contrast, for a violation
case, Article 22(1) indicates that compensation and suspension of conces-
sions are only to be used as temporary measures, and that full implemen-
tation of a measure is preferred. Although Article 26(1)(d) answers
the question whether compensation may be sought in a non-violation case,
the provision does not mention whether suspension of concessions may be
part of a mutually satisfactory adjustment as final settlement of the
dispute. Does the absence of it being mentioned in this provision and the
other provisions mean that the aggrieved party in a non-violation case
may not suspend concessions at all or does it mean that the aggrieved
party may not suspend concessions only as a final settlement of the
dispute? It can at least be logically deduced that the aggrieved party may
not suspend concessions as a final settlement of the dispute. First, since
Article 26(1)(d) only mentions compensation, it appears that the drafters
intentionally precluded suspension of concessions as a possible part of a
final settlement by failing to expressly include it in the provision2 °
Second, the possibility of suspension of concessions as a part of a final
settlement of the dispute is clearly prohibited in Article 22(1), which
expressly identifies suspension of concessions as a temporary measure.'
Therefore, only an express provision declaring suspension of concessions
as a possibility to a final settlement would suffice to negate the Article
22(1) stipulation.
The question still remains, however, whether the aggrieved party may
suspend concessions as a temporary measure. To answer this question,
further analysis of Article 26(1) is required. Article 26(1) provides that
the procedures in the Understanding will apply to a non-violation com-
plaint subject to the provisions set out within the article.' These provi-
sions, as explained above, include the non-obligation to withdraw the
' Understanding, supra note 10, art. 26(1)(c).
I99 d., art. 26(1)(d).
Id., art. 22(1).
' See Brand, supra note 16, at 140.
Understanding, supra note 10, art. 22(1).
Id., art. 26(1).
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measure, the requirement that the panel or Appellate Body recommend
that the aggrieving party make a mutually satisfactory adjustment, and the
possibility of compensation to be part of the final settlement of the
dispute. Therefore, it seems quite clear that where a procedure in another
article of the Understanding conflicts with the provisions set out under
Article 26(1), the latter provisions will prevail. But if there is no conflict
with the Article 26(1) provisions, then the procedure in the other article
of the Understanding will apply.
Using this premise, the procedures leading to a suspension of conces-
sions must be analyzed. It is assumed that a panel or Appellate Body has
found the measure to be a -non-violation nullification or impairment of
benefits. Although the aggrieving party is not required to withdraw its
measure under Article 26(1)(b), the panel or Appellate Body is required
to recommended that the aggrieving party make a mutually satisfactory
adjustment.' Under Article 21(3), the aggrieving party must comply
with the recommendations immediately. However, if it is impracticable to
comply immediately, a reasonable period of time within which the
aggrieving party is to comply with the recommendation is determined by
either (1) the DSB, (2) the parties to the dispute, if mutual, or (3) arbi-
tration.' Up to this point, the only conflict is with the provision under
Article 26(1)(c), which does not affect the ability to suspend concessions.
Next, Article 22(1) provides that compensation and suspension of
concessions are temporary measures which are "available in the event that
the recommendations and rulings are not implemented within a reasonable
period of time." At this point, Article 26(l)(d) does conflict, but it
only refers to compensation not suspension of concessions, as explained
above. Then, Article 22(2) specifically sets out two conditions of which
one must be met to proceed with compensation and suspension of conces-
sions:
(1) the aggrieved party must fail to bring the measure found to be
inconsistent with a covered agreement into conformity with the relevant
covered agreement within the determined reasonable period of time, OR
(2) the aggrieved party must fail to comply with the recommendations
and rulings within the determined reasonable period of time.'
The first condition clearly precludes a non-violation case since it only
applies to a measure that is inconsistent with, or in other words, violates
a covered agreement. However, a non-violation -case does fall under the
-Id., art. 26(1)(b).
20 Id., art. 21(3).
2 Id., art. 22(1).
2' Id., art. 22(2).
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second condition. Actually, it appears as though the drafters intended to
include this second condition exclusively for a non-violation case. First,
any violation case clearly falls under the first condition, and therefore
would not need the use of the second condition. Second, Article 22(3),
which lays out the procedure in determining what concessions are to be
suspended, uses the language "[where] the panel or Appellate Body has
found a violation or other nullification or impainnent."' 8 This language
plainly applies to both a violation and a non-violation situation because
the only other type of nullification or impairment besides a violation
nullification or impairment is a non-violation nullification or impair-
ment.' Third, Article 22(8) stipulates that
The suspension of concessions or other obligations shall be temporary
and shall only be applied until such time as the measure found to be
inconsistent with a covered agreement has been removed, or the Member
that must implement recommendations or rulings provides a solution to
the nullification or impairment of benefits, or a mutually satisfactory
solution is reached.2t0
Again, it appears as though the drafters used this language to include
both a violation and a non-violation situation. Furthermore, the rest of the
language of Article 22(2), which states that the aggrieved party may
request authorization for suspension of concessions if satisfactory compen-
sation has not been agreed to, does not conflict with any of the provi-
sions in Article 26(1).2" Therefore, from this analysis, it is possible to
suspend concessions as a temporary measure in a non-violation case in
order to induce the aggrieving party to make a mutually satisfactory
adjustment.
In conclusion, although Article 26(1) veers somewhat away from the
legal-minded, enforceable nature of a violation case and makes a non-
violation case more difficult to pursue by shifting the burden of proof
upon the aggrieved party and encouraging negotiation, it appears as
though material remedies do exist for non-violation cases.
9. Less-Developed Country Provisions
The Understanding contains a few provisions in which special
consideration is given to either least-developed or developing countries.
Although special treatment had been accorded to less-developed countries
Id., art. 22(3)(a),(d)(i) (emphasis added).
See supra note 178.
2. Understanding, supra note 10, art. 22(8) (emphasis added).
211 Id., art. 22(2).
2971996]
CASE W. RES. J. INTL L.
in the previous dispute settlement system, the Understanding distinguishes
between developing and least-developed country Members.
Special considerations to developing countries are mentioned in three
different provisions in the Understanding. First, Article 8, which deals
with the composition of panels, requires a panel to include at least one
panelist from a developing-country if the dispute is between a developing
Member and a developed-country Member when the developing-country
Member makes such a request.2 2 Second, Article 12, which deals with
panel procedures, furnishes three special considerations for developing-
country Members: (1) allows the time limits for consultations to be
extended where a measure taken by a developing-country Member is in
dispute; (2) requires a panel to accord sufficient time for a developing
country to prepare and present its argument where the complaint is
against the developing-country Member, and (3) where at least one party
to the dispute is a developing-country Member, the panel's report must
explicitly indicate the method in which account was taken of the relevant
provisions (under the agreement(s) covered by the WTO) favoring devel-
oping-country Members which had been raised by the developing-country
Member during the dispute settlement.213 Last of all, Article 21, which
deals with the surveillance of implementations of recommendations and
rulings, stipulates that "particular attention should be paid to matters
affecting the interests of developing-country Members with respect to
measures" subject to dispute settlement.2"4 Furthermore, where the case
is brought by a developing-country Member, Article 21 requires the DSB,
in considering what appropriate action might be taken, to take into
account the economic impact of the complained of measures on the
developing-country Members concerned. 5
As to special considerations given to least-developed country Mem-
bers, Article 24 stipulates special procedures where least-developed
country Members are involved."6 The issue here is how involved does
a least-developed country Member have to be in order for these consider-
ations to apply. The language of Article 24 tends to point to including
only those least-developed country Members who are actual parties to the
dispute. Article 24(1) mentions "measures taken by a least-developed
country" and Article 24(2) mentions a least-developed country Member
requesting the DSB's good offices, conciliation and mediation before a
212 Id., art. 8(10).
213 Id., art. 12(10),(11).
214 Id., art. 21(2).
215 Id., art. 21(8).
216 Id., art. 24 (emphasis added).
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request for a panel is made.217 If Article 24 was meant to be more
expansive, the word "affecting" would have been used instead of "involv-
ing." Nevertheless, where the dispute settlement procedures involve least-
developing country Members, Article 24 requires that Members give
particular consideration to the special situation of such Members at all
stages of the dispute by exercising due restraint in raising matters under
dispute procedures. These matters include asking for compensation or
seeking authorization to suspend concessions.218 In addition to Article 24
of the Understanding, Article XI(2) of the Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization stipulates:
The least-developed countries recognized as such by the United
Nations will only be required to undertake commitments and concessions
to the extent consistent with their individual development, financial and
trade needs or their administrative and institutional capabilities.219
The biggest issue, however, of who is a developing country and who
is a least-developed country, is still unanswered. Although Article XI(2)
of the Agreement Establishing the WTO says that least-developed coun-
tries are determined by the United Nations, it is unclear who these
countries are.
IV. THE BANANA TRADE WAR UNDER THE WTO's UNDERSTANDING
A. Possible Avenues Around the GATT Waiver?
As described in part I.E, the GATT waiver of the trade provisions
of Lom6 IV does not grant complete immunity to the -EEC's banana
import regime. First, only GATT's Article I MFN clause is waived which
allows the EEC to provide preferential treatment for bananas originating
in ACP countries without extending the same preferential treatment to
other Contracting Parties.' This waiver only protects the EEC from
challenges based on Article I's MFN clause. Second, the waiver allows
any Member to bring a challenge if either the relevant Lom6 IV provi-
sions under the waiver are being applied inconsistently or if any benefits
are being impaired or nullified as a result of the preferential treatment to
ACP products." Finally, the waiver does not preclude affected Mem-
bers from having recourse to Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT.'
217 Id.
238 Id., art 24(1).
239 WTO Agreement, supra note 15, art. XI(2).
Waiver, supra note 4, para. 1.
22 Id., para. 4.
m Id., para. 6.
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It must be noted here that the EEC is not obligated under Lom6 IV
to implement the banana import regime as it currently stands. The only
obligation the EEC has to the ACP countries as to banana imports is not
to place the ACP countries who are traditional suppliers to the EEC "in
a less favorable situation than in the past or at present" as regards access
to, and advantages in, the EEC market' z The EEC had a choice as to
how to afford preferential treatment to ACP banana imports; however, it
.chose to do it in a way that turns out to apparently conflict with the
GATI'. 4 Consequently, despite securing of the waiver, a couple of
avenues might be available to challenge the banana import regime under
the WTO's Understanding. The possible types of claims that might be
available in a GATT challenge are:
(1) a claim where the preferential treatment for ACP bananas covered
by the waiver is being applied inconsistently with the waiver,
(2) a violation claim under Article XXIII(l)(a) where the banana import
regime violates a GATT provision other than Article I's MFN clause; or
(3) a non-violation claim under Article XXIl(l)(b) where a benefit
accruing to a Member under the GATr is being nullified unduly by the
implementation of the banana import regime.
Whether or not any of these types of claims can be brought and achieve
an adequate remedy under the new Understanding is yet to be seen.
1. Inconsistent with Waiver Claim
Any Member may establish a panel where it considers that the
preferential treatment for ACP banana imports covered by the waiver is
being applied inconsistently with the waiver if consultations have proved
unsatisfactory. ' This type of claim would most likely occur where the
EEC either grants additional concessions or adds new countries or prod-
ucts to Lom6 IV.' However, this type of claim would most likely
involve new products and concessions that would be outside the scope of
Lom6 IV, supra note 32, protocol 5 and Annex LXXIV.
The World Bank's most recent study of the banana trade war states that the
EEC, in making up the banana regime, chose one of the worst and inefficient methods
to help out the ACP countries. The Bank says that the consumers and the efficient
"dollar zone" producers are being penalized while the few marketers of ACP bananas
are raking it in. The Bank suggests that the ACP countries should get direct aid from
the EEC instead. The World Bank Has Published a Study Criticizing the EU's Banana
Regime, MULTiNATIONAL SERVICE, Feb. 2, 1995, available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL
8360024.
SId.
See EU Includes Framework Agreement, supra note 2, at 11.
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the banana import regime. Furthermore, even if this type of claim in-
volved the banana import regime, i.e., adding new countries, such a
violation would probably not force the EEC to change its banana import
regime, but rather limit its application.
2. Violation Claim
The EEC banana import regime may also be challenged by a Mem-
ber under an Article XXlI(1)(a) violation claim where such Member's
benefits under the GAIT are being impaired unduly as a result of the
EEC's failure to carry out its obligations under the GATT.' Of course,
the obligation under Article I's MFN clause is excluded by reason of the
waiver. The number of inconsistencies or violations, with GATT provi-
sions, however, seem to be quite limited.
A look at the last GATT panel on the EEC's current banana import
regime shows that the regime was inconsistent with Articles I(1), II, and
III, but was consistent with Articles XI, XHI, and XVI of the GATIT.'
An Article I(1) challenge, though, is not feasible since the MFN clause
is exempted by the waiver. An Article II schedule of concessions
challenge, likewise, will not work because the EEC's banana import
regime was implemented in the schedule of concessions as part of the
Uruguay Round. 9 This leaves an Article I challenge of the discrimi-
natory effect of the allocation of import licenses under the EEC's tariff
quota. '
Assuming a panel or Appellate Body, agreeing with the last GATT
panel, concludes that the EEC's banana import regime violates Article I,
the question of available remedies remains. Under Article 19 of the
Understanding, where a panel or Appellate Body finds that a measure
violates a GATT provision, it must recommend that the aggrieving party
bring the measure into conformity with the relevant provision." Fur-
thermore, as noted in part I.B.4-5, the adoption of a panel or Appellate
report is essentially automatic. In other words, if a panel or Appellate
Body finds that the banana import regime violates Article III, the EEC
will be bound by the decision and would have to change its regime to
conform with Article II. However, Article I only deals with giving
Waiver, supra note 4, para. 4; GATT, supra note 1, art. XXIII(l)(a), at 39.
GATT7 Panel #2, supra note 75, paras. 169-70, at 230.
U.S. Launches Case on EU, supra note 101, at 12.
See discussion supra part II.C.2.
231 Understanding, supra note 10, art. 19(1).
232 Article 21(1) states that "prompt compliance with recommendations or rulings of
the DSB is essential in order to ensure effective resolution of disputes to the benefit
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import products the same treatment as domestic products. 3 Therefore,
this violation only concerns the treatment of "dollar zone" banana imports
as compared to the treatment of EEC bananas in the context of the
import licensing scheme. Nevertheless, assuming that the EEC is in vio-
lation of Article III, it would either have to alter the licensing scheme to
accord "dollar zone" bananas the same treatment as EEC bananas, or
abolish the licensing scheme altogether.
Note, however, that Article 21 stipulates that in implementing the
ruling of the panel, particular attention should be paid to how these
changes may affect developing-country Members. 4 Article 24, on the
other hand, requires special attention to be paid throughout the dispute
settlement procedure where the dispute involves least-developed country
Members. 5 The level of special consideration will depend on how the
certain ACP or "dollar zone" banana supplying country Members are
classified and whether they will be involved in the dispute. Although an
Article I violation only directly concerns the treatment of EEC bananas,
a change in the banana import regime may have some indirect effects on
ACP banana imports and countries. For example, an Article In violation
may require the EEC to alter or abolish the licensing scheme which, in
turn, may cause a reduction in banana imports from the ACP countries.
However, the EEC would still be bound under Lom6 IV's Protocol 5 and
Annex LXXIV to import the traditional amounts duty free and maintain
the advantages in the EEC market that the ACP countries had previously
enjoyed 36 Furthermore, the fourteen-member Caribbean Community and
Common Market (CARICOM) argues that a change or abolishment of the
current banana import regime would have an enormous negative economic
impact upon and possibly jeopardize the stability of the Caribbean
nations." Therefore, even in implementing a panel's ruling that the
EEC bring the banana import regime into conformity with Article IHI,
these conflicting issues, as well as the situation of the "dollar zone" coun-
tries might have to be taken into account.
Keeping the above in mind, if the EEC does not bring the banana
import regime into conformity with Article III within the reasonable time
period determined by Article 21(3), then the aggrieved party has recourse
of all Members." Id., art. 21(1).
3 GATT, supra note 1, art. I, at 6.
Understanding, supra note 10, art. 21(2).
23 Id., art. 24.
2 See Lom6 IV, supra note 32, Protocol 5 & Annex LXXIV.
3 Caribbean Nations Urge USTR to Drop Banana Case, Negotiate Deal, INsIDE
U.S. TRADE, Mar. 24, 1995, at 7.
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to Article 22. 8 Article 22 provides for compensation and suspension of
concessions as temporary measures. 9 If the EEC and the aggrieved par-
ty cannot agree to satisfactory compensation,2' then the aggrieved party
may request authorization from the DSB to suspend concessions under the
covered agreements of the Understanding. 4 Article 22(3) not only al-
lows the suspension of concessions from the same sector as the violating
measure, in this case, goods, but also from another agreement covered by
the Understanding, such as services or intellectual property, if the ag-
grieved party believes it is not practicable to suspend concessions in the
same sector or same agreement and that the circumstances are serious
enough. 2' Consequently, the aggrieved party would not be limited in
suspending concessions against the EEC under the GATT. As noted in
part MI.B.7, the authorization to suspend concessions is essentially auto-
matic. Therefore, it would not be a surprise if suspension of concessions
will be more frequently resorted to under this new system to enforce a
panel or Appellate Body report. Finally, as provided in Article 22(8), the
aggrieved party would be able to suspend concessions against the EEC
until either the EEC conforms its banana import regime to be consistent
with Article I or a mutually satisfactory solution is reached.243
In conclusion, the possibility of a violation claim against the EEC's
banana import regime, armed with the imposing waiver, is very limited.
However, a successful Article HI challenge under the Understanding, with
its stricter rules, would seem at least to afford an effective partial remedy
to the discriminatory licensing scheme.
3. Non-violation Claim
In order for a complaining party to bring a non-violation claim
against the EEC's banana import regime, the complaining party must ei-
ther allege (1) that its benefits under the GATT are being impaired or
nullified, or (2) that the attainment of any objective of the GATT is
being impeded as a result of the implementation of the banana import
regime, regardless of whether or not the complained of measure conflicts
' See Understanding, supra note 10, art. 21.
239 Id., art. 22.
240 At least one commentator has proposed that compensation does not mean money
damages, but instead the grant of a concession by the aggrieving party on a product
or service that is of interest to the aggrieved party. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Remedies
Along with Rights: Institutional Reform in the New GATT, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 477,
486 (1994).
24 Understanding, supra note 10, art. 22(2).
242 Id., art. 22(3).
243 Id., art. 22(8).
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with the provisions of GATT.2' This would include, as set out in the
waiver, the "undue" impairment of benefits as a result of the preferential
treatment to ACP banana imports. 5 Since the waiver only waives the
provisions of Article I(1) and expressly allows a Member to have re-
course to Article XXIII, it appears as though a Member may bring a non-
violation claim against the EEC's current banana import regime.'z How-
ever, the issue is whether such a claim can be made despite the waiver,
and if it can be made successfully, whether an effective remedy is
available under the new Understanding.
A possible first non-violation claim is that although the M]FN clause
of Article I is waived, thereby precluding an Article I violation claim, an
Article I non-violation claim can be brought because a non-violation
claim does not require a conflict with any provisions of GAT. In other
words, the claim would be that the preferential treatment under the EEC's
banana import regime, although "not violating" Article I(1) since the
obligation arising from the MFN clause has been waived, nevertheless
impairs or nullifies benefits accrued under the GATT. However, this
claim does not seem to work. In the banana trade war, the main conten-
tion is that the "dollar zone" bananas are not accorded the same pref-
erential treatment as ACP bananas, which is required under Article I(1)
of the GATT.27 But since the waiver covers the EEC's obligation to
apply most-favored nation treatment toward third country bananas, it
seems as though a Member should be precluded from bringing any kind
of claim based on the banana import regime's preferential treatment.
In Restrictions on Importation of Sugar, a previously adopted GATr
panel report, the panel dealt with an EEC non-violation claim against a
U.S. measure that was covered by a waiver.' The panel held that the
fact that the measure at issue, found to be inconsistent with Article XI(l),
is covered by a waiver does not prevent the EEC from bringing a non-
violation claim.249 The panel recognized that a non-violation claim may
be based on GATT provisions other than Article U." ° The panel further
held that it was up to the EEC to show that the nullification or impair-
ment of benefits accruing to it under the GAT resulted from such
2'44 GATr, supra note 1, art. XXIII(1)(b), at 39.
245 Waiver, supra note 4, para. 4.
24 See id., para. 6.
247 GATT, supra note 1, art. I(1), at 2.
248 Restrictions on the Importation of Sugar and Sugar-Containing Products, GAT,
BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 228 (37th Supp. 1991) (adopted on
Nov. 7, 1990).
249 Id., para. 5.20, at 261.
20 Id.
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measure."' However, the panel stated that the non-violation claim must
"be supported by a justification that goes beyond a mere characterization
of the measure at issue as inconsistent with" the GA'IT. 2 In other
words, a non-violation claim may not be based exclusively on an in-
consistency with GAT, despite the fact a waiver covers the inconsistent
measure. There must be another basis for the non-violation claim besides
the inconsistency itself. In conclusion, though, the panel did state that the
EEC was not precluded from bringing a non-violation claim with the re-
quired detailed justification.' This panel decision seems to open the
window for a non-violation complaint in a waiver situation, even though
the opening is just a small crack. But the chance for another shot at a
non-violation claim for the EEC seemed more like a consolation because
there was nothing left on which to base a non-violation claim.
Although previously adopted panel reports do not carry stare decisis
effect, the precedential effect of Restrictions on Importation of Sugar
makes a non-violation claim based on the banana import regime's incon-
sistency with Article I(1), in spite of the waiver, seem implausible. Such
a claim could only be made if the complaining party justifies the claim
with more than allegations that the regime is inconsistent with Article
I(1). The complaining party would have to demonstrate that the preferen-
tial treatment afforded to ACP bananas nullifies or impairs some other
benefit accruing to it under the GATT besides the benefit under Article
1(1). This type of showing seems to be almost impossible since no
benefits under the banana tariff concession are being impaired (i.e., by a
subsidy) and if benefits were being impaired under other provisions of the
GAIT, it would be considered an Article XXIII(l)(a) violation claim.
However, there is a possible non-violation claim that fits through the
crack. As Restrictions on Importation of Sugar suggests, a non-violation
claim may be "based" on other provisions of the GATT besides Article
H." The claim is that the EEC's banana import regime impairs or
25 Id.
2" Id., para. 5.21, at 262.
2 Id., para. 6.3, at 263.
"' Id., para. 5.21, at 262. In the unadopted panel report, EC-Tariff Treatment on
Imports of Citrus Products from Certain Countries in the Mediterranean Region, Feb.
7, 1985, the panel stated that an Article XXIII(1)(b) claim was not limited to those
benefits accruing under Article II. The panel said that the drafting history of Article
XXIII confirmed that this Article protected any benefit under the GATT, including, for
example, the benefits accruing under Article 1(1). The panel further noted that "the
basic purpose of Article XXIII:I(b) was to provide for offsetting or compensatory ad-
justment in situations in which the balance of rights and obligations of the contracting
parties had been disturbed." GATr, ANALY'Ic INDEX: GuiDE TO GATr LAW AND
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nullifies a banana-supplying third country Member's benefit accrued to it
under Article X's general elimination of quantitative restrictions 5 In
the alternative, the Member can claim that the banana import regime
impedes the attainment of the GATT objective to prohibit quantitative re-
strictions.
In the last GAiT panel decision regarding the banana import regime,
the panel held that the regime did not violate Article XI of the
GATT.16 Article XI stipulates that a Member cannot institute any "pro-
hibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether
made effectively through quotas, import or export licenses or other mea-
sures" on products imported from or exported to another Member.
The panel found that the Contracting Parties had never regarded tariff
quotas as "restrictions" within the meaning of Article XI nor high tariff
rates as quantitative restrictions under Article XI merely because of their
adverse trade effects." The panel further found that the existence of
non-automatic import licensing, which was the case under the tariff quota,
did not contribute to making the tariff quota a quantitative restriction
because the importers had a right to import bananas outside the quota. 9
Since the banana import regime's tariff quota, at least according to
one GAiT panel, does not violate Article XI, a non-violation argument
is possible. First, Members accrue certain benefits directly or indirectly
under the GATIT.' For example, Members accrue a benefit from (1)
being accorded most-favored nation status under Article I(1), (2) tariff
concessions negotiated under Article I, or (3) having their products
accorded the same treatment as another Member's like domestic products
under Article II. Likewise, Members accrue a benefit from having
their products exempt from quantitative restrictions under Article XI. 2
Under the banana import regime, even though the tariff quota is not
considered de jure a quantitative restriction, it effectively imposes de
facto a quantitative restriction on third country banana imports. 3
PRACrncE 614-15 (1994).
' See GATT, supra note 1, art. XI, at 17.
16 GATT Panel #2, supra note 75, paras. 139-40, at 218-19.
u GATT, supra note 1, art. XI(1), at 17.
' GATT Panel #2, supra note 75, para. 139, at 219.
259 Id., para. 140.
' Dr. Coombs, the author of the original text of Article XXI which was drafted
during the ITO negotiations, explained "benefits" as those which "countries derive from
the acceptance of the wider obligations imposed by the Charter [now GATT]." ROBERT
E. HUDEC, THE GAT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE POLICY 43 (1990).
6 See GATT, supra note 1, arts. I(1), II, 1H, at 2-7.
2 See id., art. XI, at 17.
" The EEC, arguably, effectively imposed a quantitative restriction on third country
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Consequently, third country banana suppliers' benefits to export the actual
amounts the EEC market would demand are impaired. In the alternative,
if it is found that a benefit does not accrue from Article XI, it can be
argued that the elimination of quantitative restrictions is an objective of
the GATT and its attainment is being impeded as a result of the banana
import regime's tariff quota. Again, the argument remains that this
particular tariff quota is de facto a quantitative restriction. For both of
these claims, an analogy with European Community law is appropriate.
Article 30 of the EEC Treaty, the equivalent of Article XI of the
GATT, prohibits "quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures
having equivalent effect." The concept "measures having equivalent
effect" has been given a very broad interpretation by both the European
Commission and the European Court of Justice, and has become a
powerful tool in the efforts to achieve market integration within the
EEC.' Basically, any type of measure that effectively acts as a quanti-
tative restriction in any kind of way has been found to violate Article
30.' Although Article XI of the GATT does not include the concept
"measures having equivalent effect," by analogy, it could be used as a
basis for a non-violation claim. As previously mentioned, Article XI of
the GAIT is meant to prohibit non-tariff quantitative restrictions among
all GATT members. But what if a certain measure, such as a tariff quota,
which does not "fit" within the express meaning of Article XI, nev-
ertheless has an equivalent, effect of a quantitative restriction? 7 Should
a Member be allowed to disguise a quantitative restriction, for example
as a tariff quota, and circumvent Article X? This is where a non-viola-
tion claim comes in. Even though such a measure does not violate Article
XI, it nonetheless is an effective equivalent of a quantitative restriction
and therefore impairs the benefit accrued under Article XI and/or impedes
banana imports by charging a tariff eight and one-half times more than the applicable
tariff under the quota to imports that exceeded the quotas and a restrictive import
licensing scheme. It would be infeasible for third country banana suppliers to enter the
EEC market at such a high tariff level. See Commission Regulation 404/93, supra note
50, art. 18; GATT Panel #2, supra note 75, paras. 53-63, at 195-98.
24 EEC Treaty, art. 30 (emphasis added).
2m GEORGE A. BERMANN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNrrY LAW
341-42 (1993).
For example, a Belgian law requiring importers to furnish a certificate of origin
for certain types of hard liquor where the certificate has to actually come from the
country of origin. Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837.
' Of course, not all tariff quotas are going to be effectively equivalent to a
quantitative restriction. Only those which impose a high enough over-the-quota tariff
where it would be practically and economically impossible for a product to be imported
will be effectively equivalent to a quantitative restriction.
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the attainment of one of the objectives under the GAT.
Therefore, assuming a successful challenge of a non-violation claim
against the EEC's banana import regime, the question of whether any
effective remedies are available remains. Unlike the straightforward and
rather effective remedies available under a successful violation case, those
available to a successful non-violation case are somewhat ambiguous. As
previously analyzed under part I.B.8 of this Article, the Understanding
made a break from the prior system by distinguishing the remedies
available to a violation and a non-violation complaint. Under Article
26(1) of the Understanding, the pursuit of remedies under a GATT
Article XXIII(1)(b) non-violation complaint, in contrast to what is normal-
ly afforded to a GATT Article XXflI(1)(a) violation complaint, is subject
to certain provisions." However, although the Understanding distin-
guishes non-violation cases from violation cases, it appears as though an
aggrieved party can still obtain nearly the same remedies for a successful
non-violation case. In effect, even though Article 26(1) makes a non-
violation case more difficult to establish (i.e. by shifting the burden of
proof to the complaining party), and tries to encourage mutual agreement
(i.e. negotiation) rather than strict conformity to the covered agreement,
the remedies of compensation and suspension of concessions are available
to ensure a satisfactory mutual solution to the dispute.
Thus, if an aggrieved party successfully challenges the EEC's banana
import regime in a non-violation case, effective remedies will be available
to enforce the decision. For example, although the EEC would not be
obligated to withdraw the banana import regime, it would be required to
make a mutually satisfactory adjustment. This type of adjustment would
probably include negotiations between the parties to the dispute where the
EEC would either compensate the other party(ies) with the granting of
certain concessions or even modify certain parts of its import regime,
or both. As noted in the above analysis, in a non-violation case, Article
26(1)(d) allows compensation to be voluntarily part of a final settlement
of the dispute." However, in such a case where the EEC would fail to
make a mutually satisfactory adjustment, the EEC would be able to
suspend concessions as a temporary measure to compel the EEC to make
such an adjustment." It must be noted, though, that the level of the
suspensions of concessions must not surpass the level of the nullification
26s See Understanding, supra note 10, art. 26(1).
Cf. Lowenfeld, supra note 240, at 486 (proposing that compensation might
include the granting of concessions by the aggrieving party).
270 Understanding, supra note 10, art. 26(1)(d).
' Id., art. 22(8).
308 [Vol. 28:265
BANANA TRADE WAR
or impairment.2 a
In conclusion, even though the window seems to be shut on bringing
a non-violation claim, one narrow type of a non-violation claim may
possibly work against the banana import regime. If such a claim is
successful, it also appears as though the new Understanding may furnish
adequate remedies. Nevertheless, if the dispute involves either a develop-
ing or least-developed country Member, special consideration must be
given to such Members 3 However, since the measure at issue is that
of the EEC, due restraint does not need to be exercised in asking for
compensation or seeking authorization to suspend concessionsY4 Since
neither Article 26(1) nor the entire Understanding has yet been applied to
a GATr dispute, the banana trade war would be an ideal case to test its
waters.
B. The Role of Unilateral Action - U.S. Section 301
Under the Understanding, the role of unilateral action appears to be
severely limited by the Members' efforts to strengthen the adherence to
the multilateral system of dispute settlement. 5 This limitation raises the
question of whether U.S. use of Section 301 in the banana trade war
would be compatible with the Understanding and to what extent Section
301 may be used under a GATT dispute.
Section 301 investigations and findings are completely separate from
any international dispute settlement system. However, Section 301 is seen
as the domestic counterpart to the prior GATT dispute settlement system.
Under that system, Section 301 was a helpful tool in catalyzing dispute
settlement where contracting parties either refused to follow the dispute
settlement procedures or to implement the recommendations of a panel
reportY This use was clearly evident in the Oilseeds case, where the
threat of U.S. retaliation under Section 301 led to an agreement with the
EEC to resolve the dispute, notwithstanding the EEC's refusal to fully
implement one GATT panel report and blocking the adoption of another
panel report.'
The use of Section 301 as a complement to the Understanding,
21 Id., art. 22(4).
z See id., arts. 21, 24. See discussion supra part III.B.9.
7 See Understanding, supra note 10, art. 24(1).
27 See HUDEC, ENFORCING, supra note 183, at 234-39.
276 See Arnold, supra note 17, at 217; Alan 0. Sykes, Constructive Unilateral
Threats in International Commercial Relations: The Limit Case for Section 301, 23
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 263 (1992).
' See Brand, supra note 16, at 130-32.
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however, seems to be limited by two factors. First, the new changes to
the dispute settlement system have appeared to fill in the gaps where
Section 301 was used to facilitate the enforcement of the system. These
changes, such as stricter time limits in settling disputes, automatic estab-
lishment of panels, automatic adoption of panel or Appellate Body
reports, and automatic authorization of suspension of concessions, have
strengthened the binding effect of the system, giving less cause for using
Section 301, or any unilateral action for that matter.278 Second, Article
23 of the Understanding expressly precludes the use of unilateral action
where a Member seeks redress of an impairment or nullification under
any of the covered agreementsY9 In other words, Members must rely
on the dispute settlement system to remedy the dispute. Therefore, under
this provision, the use of Section 301 to impose unilateral sanctions in a
GATT dispute appear to be prohibited.
However, a couple of instances may exist where Section 301 could
be used as a counterpart to the new dispute settlement system. First,
Section 301 may still be used as a vehicle for private parties to initiate
a GATT complaint. ° This is the situation with the banana war. The
U.S. banana companies, Chiquita and the Association, have initiated,
through Section 301, investigations into the EEC's banana import re-
gime."' Accordingly, the United States requested consultations with the
EEC pursuant to Section 301 procedure, which conforms to GATT's
Article XXII. 2 If the USTR determines that a solution to the dispute
cannot be met with the EEC, the next logical step would be to request
the establishment of a panel under the Understanding and let the process
take care of itself in the international arena.
A second instance where Section 301 may still be used, although not
under the dispute resolution system, is to take unilateral action in areas
not covered by the Understanding and against countries which are not
WTO members.' This type of action, of course, is not relevant to the
banana trade war because the banana trade war is specifically covered by
GATT, an agreement covered by the Understanding, and the EEC is a
Member of the WTO.
Despite the limitation on the use of Section 301, the United States
has hinted that it might retaliate on its own under Section 30L 4 This
See Partan, supra note 16, at 346-47; see discussion supra part III.
9 Understanding, supra note 10, art. 23.
o Lowenfeld, supra note 240, at 481.
28 60 Fed. Reg. 53495 (1994).
22 d.; see GATT, supra note 1, art. XXII, at 39.
U.S. Official Admits Constraints on Section 301 Retaliation Under WTO, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, Jan. 20, 1995, at 10.
' Kantor Threatens Retaliation Over European Banana Policy, INSIDE U.S. TRADE,
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threat of unilateral action brings up the question of whether threats of
unilateral retaliation are permitted under Article 23 of the Understanding.
Article 23 only requires that a Member "not make a determination to the
effect that a violation has occurred, [etc.] except through recourse to
dispute settlement" under the procedures and rules of the Understand-
ing." Article 23 does not explicitly forbid threats of unilateral retalia-
tion. However, given the fact that actual unilateral retaliation is illegal
under Article 23, is not the threat of doing something illegal considered
to be illegal as well? Perhaps not. But even inferring that Article 23
forbids threats of unilateral retaliation will not prevent such threats from
occurring because there is no substantial penalty provided for such an
"action." Since there is generally no material harm or damage from such
threats, the penalty would add up to no more than a slap on the
wrist.' Furthermore, although the United States might be threatening
unilateral retaliation, it might not follow through with that threat. If the
United States unilaterally retaliates, it would violate the Understanding,
exposing itself to a challenge under a WTO panel and damaging its
international reputation.' In other words, the cards are in the players'
hands, and the cards should fall as they will. It is up to the EEC to call
the bluff of the United States. In order for threats of unilateral retaliation
to be illegal and deterred under the Understanding, a provision with an
explicit penalty is needed.
Given the nature of the changes made to the new dispute settlement
system under the Understanding to strengthen its enforceability, unilateral
action, such as the use of United States' Section 301, now appears to
Jan. 13, 1995, at 1.
Understanding, supra note 10, art. 23(2)(a).
A threat alone may only cause apprehension of the possibility of being harmed.
In such a case, no real economic harm is inflicted, such as a rise in tariffs. Where no
true harm is done, there is nothing tangible against which a penalty can be measured.
However, it can be argued that the intimidation itself caused or forced the threatened
party to "give in" and change its measure, and therefore, as a result, being economical-
ly injured. But isn't this the end result that was being sought in the first place-for the
threatened party to conform to international norms? Is this really a harm or damage?
Should we penalize the threatening party for "achieving" such a result? Again, how
would you measure such a penalty? As it stands, the Understanding does not provide
an adequate penalty for threats of unilateral action. If such threats were considered a
violation of Article 23, the only remedy would be for a panel to recommend that the
threatening party stop threatening, because Article 22(4) only allows the level of the
suspension of concessions to be equivalent to the level of impairment. See Understand-
ing, supra note 10, arts. 1(1),19, 22(4), 23. Again, with a threat, is there a tangible
impairment?
See Partan, supra note 16, at 349; Sykes, supra note 277.
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serve only limited purposes.
V. CONCLUSION
The dawning of the WTO, with a radically new Understanding on
the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, in the
midst of an overheating banana trade war has provided a perfect environ-
ment in which to analyze both the possible actions and remedies available
under the GATT and the new Understanding despite an imposing waiver.
This analysis demonstrates that although the EEC's waiver of the trade
provisions of Lom6 IV from Article I's MFN clause has precluded almost
all challenges against the EEC's banana import regime, the regime is
perhaps vulnerable to attack. The possibility of an Article XXIII(1)(a)
violation action is limited to an Article III claim which does not directly
involve ACP bananas, while the possibility of an Article XXIII(l)(b) non-
violation claim is limited to a new concept of "equivalent effect" involv-
ing the prohibition of quantitative restrictions under Article XI. Whether
or not these claims will succeed under a WTO panel is yet to be seen.
The new dispute settlement system under the rules and procedures of
the Understanding provides a more legalistic and time-conscious approach,
binding offending Members to decisions while keeping the whole process
within a stringent time-frame. If a challenge is successful, there would be
a difference in the procedures in achieving remedies under violation and
non-violation cases. The former is more rule-enforcement oriented,
requiring the aggrieving party to conform its measure to the provisions of
GATT while the latter is more negotiation-based, only requiring a mutual-
ly satisfactory solution. However, both situations permit the use of
retaliation in order to achieve a final settlement to the dispute. Neverthe-
less, in disputes which involve either developing or least-developed
country Members, certain special considerations may have to be afforded
to these Members. And by requiring Members to rely on the system for
resolving their disputes and by changing the system to be more effective,
the drafters have limited the use of and the need for unilateral action.
Currently, the EEC is under pressure to change its banana import
regime. However, if the EEC does not significantly alter its regime by the
time the waiver expires, February 29, 2000, the regime will be in great
jeopardy. Not only will the waiver expire that day, but so will Lom6 IV.
Without the cover of the waiver and the backing of Lom6 IV, the regime
will be easily challenged under an Article I(1) violation claim. And under
the legalistic rules of the Understanding, the EEC will be forced to
completely overhaul its regime to provide third country banana imports
the similar treatment it provides ACP banana imports.
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